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1. Introduction
The main purpose of this paper is to present a systematic analysis of the
background, the establishment and the development of the so-called Popo
fisheries around the town of Pointe-NoIre in Congo. The "Pop o" in Pointe-
Noire constitutes an easily identifiable group of fishermen originally from
Benin who live and work in two vill age clusters on the beach only some
kilometres from the town centre. Both in relation to Popo fishery in Benin
as well to local canoe fishery in Congo, their production is characterised by
a high level of specialisation and market-oriented production based on
capital-intensive technology. In this respect they are a typical example of
what is now generally known as the West African mIgrant canoe fisheries,
which domInate much of the coastal fisheries from Mauritania to Congo.1
Although a relatively large amount of literature deals explicitly with the
West African fishermen in Congo, mainly due to the existence of a long-
term ORSTOM fisheries research programme in Pointe-Noire, few works
have systematically dealt with its historical development. 2 Most of them
describe and analyse production (and to a mInor extent the community) for
a specific time-period. Such studies may provide interesting knowledge, but
in order to grasp the more fundamental factors behind the dynamIc aspects
of the fishery, a more process-oriented approach of the fishing community
is required.
The literature has also tended to concentrate on physical and quantitative
aspects of Popo fishery rather than on qualitative relational aspects. On
basis of the existing literature it is fairly simple to get a satisfactory picture
of the demographic development in the community or the development in
means of production, like eg. number of canoes, nets and outboard engines.
Much more difficult, however, is to get a picture of, for instance, how
wealth and power have been distributed or what types of institutions exist
to solve various types of problems and how they function.
For a general description and analysis of the migrant canoe fisheries in West Africa, see
e.g. Chaboud and Charles Dominiques 1991 and Chauveau 1991.
2 Nguinguiri 1991b is one of the few exceptions where the internal development is
explicitly being described and discussed. However, due to lack of data, there are several
inaccuracies in his presentation, particularly related to the past 10 years.
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Furthermore, the available literature reflects what may be terme d a
certain production- and male-centrism. Means and organisation of
production is focused and since it is the men who go to sea and who
operate the canoes, scant attention has been paid to the role of women,
even in cases focusing on distribution and trade. In view of the relatively
large literature emphasising the economic role and influence of women in
West African fisheries, this is somewhat surprising. The scope of this paper
is broader in the sense that it includes all aspects of social life seen as
important for a proper understanding of Popo fishery.
The major problem caused by the above-noted weaknesses has been the
creation of certain myths. conceming the character of Popo production.
Simple observations related to growth in catches and means of production
(particularly in the 1970s) have led authors to conclude that Popo fishery
is highly dynamic. However, since no investigations exist as to the
character of this dynamism, the overall interpretation has been to link it to
the high degree of market orientation and capital intensity and thereby refer
to the West African fisheries as a kind of pseudo-capitalistic venture.
Formulations like "increased accumulation of capital", "high lev el of re-
investment and ' intensification of production" are of ten used to
characterise the Popo and distinguish the migrants from the local ViIi
fishermen. However, the documentation given, if any, is problematic and
it is my aim to challenge such representations, which seem increasingly
widespread particularly among agents involved in development aid and
technical assistance.3
This is by no means to deny the well-documented fact that Pop o fishing
units have at their disposal far more means of production than do the ViIi,
or that theIr direct level of reinvestment in means of production is much
higher in financial terms.4 Nor is there any reason to doubt that increased
market integration has affected their production. However, the formulations
referred to above, particularly when used in combination with other
formulations like "very dynamic production systems", easily and almost
unavoidably lead to an interpretation of steady growth, more and more
accumulation, more and more means of production and steady increase in
fishing effort in line with traditional Western concepts of growth. As will
3 J-c. Nguinguiri has in various works (eg. 1990 and 1991a) pointed out how consultants
(and to some extent also researchers) misunderstand the ViIi fishery in attempting to
distinguish the migrant Popo from the local ViIi fishermen according to such categories
(Popo-dynamism versus Vili-stagnation). As wil be demonstrated here, they have also
misunderstood that of the Popo.
4 See e.g. Niel1973, Chaboud 1982, Gobert 1985b.
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be shown, the main factors affecting the dynamism in Popo fishery are
often others than the laws of the market. From a somewhat different
perspective I have earlIer (Jul-Larsen 1992) argued along the same lines at
a more generalIeveL. However, only an in-depth empirical analysis can
provide the data required to understand the specific logic of Popo
fishermen' s exploitation of resources.
A historical analysis of the Pop o Pointe-Noire community also provides
the opportunity to relate our findings to recent discussions conceming the
underlying factors behind the migration and specialisation processes in
West African canoe fisheries as such. Understandably enough literature
dealing with the Pop o focuses mainly on theIr situation in Benin. Little has
been done to analyse the situation at home in light of what happens
abroad,5 or vice-versa. P.J.M. Jorion (1985b and 1988) is among the few
who has explicitly linked what happens abroad to the situation in Benin,
arguing that migration and specialisation processes can be understood only
in light of marginalisation of people in their original home areas. In a reply
to Jorion, G.K. Nukunya (1989) argues with reference to another group of
fishermen, the Anlo Ewe, that although marginalisation may have played
a role, it is mainly pull factors like increased availability of fish, market
outlets etc., combined with entrepreneurial qualities among the fishermen
which have led to the new migration and specialisation patterns. The
empirical evidence presented, however, is often unsatisfactory for drawing
the type of conclusions both of them do. The following case study may in
this way contribute to a better understanding of this important question.
Although the existing literature seems to demonstrate certain weaknesses,
it must immediately be added that this study could not have been produced
without heavily relying upon data from the same lIterature.
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Beside Pointe-Noire, there are important settlements of Pop o fishermen in Librevile,
Port-Gentil, two towns near Douala and near Abidjan.
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2. The Popo community of today
The community as such counts a lIttle less than 500 fishermen and almost
as many adult women. Together with some of theIr children they live in
two villages on the northem beach of Pointe-Noire. With some very few
exceptions, all the men are full-time fishermen in that they either own
and/or work in a particular type of canoe fishery connected to their name.
The great majority of the women smoke fish and sell it either as whole-
salers or as retailers on the various markets in Pointe-Noire. The ethnonym
IPOpo' makes reference to the European name of the village Grand Popo
in the Lower Mono region in South West Benin. In fact, not all the Popo
come from Grand Popo, as the community includes people from several
groups. The gre at majority are either Xwla who originally come from
different villages along the coastline between the Togolese border and
Djegbadji near the town of Ouidah; or X weda from Ouidah town or
villages around or close to Lac Ahémé. Two Mina households of Togolese
(Anecho) origin are also part of the community as well as one Anlo Ewe
household and a small number of young Anlo Ewe workers. The latter
group who originally come from the Anlo peninsula in Eastern Ghana, have
all lived and worked in Benin before they migrated to Congo.1 Almost all
community members are directly or indirectly related to each other through
links of kinship and/or mariage. This, however, does not necessarily mean
that kinship is considered of great relevance in all types of intern al
relations.
The Popo have specialised in fishing for pelagic sardinella and ethmalosis
species, using driftnets from the big motorised Ghanaian type of canoes.
They occasionally fish for demersal species with lines or bottom gill nets.
However, the latter fishery is mainly connected with the local ViIi
fishermen, who are scattered all along the 170km Congolese coastline. In
Pointe-Noire the local fishermen are in the minority compared to the Popo
and are less easily identified, since many live in the town suburbs and not
The general literature on West African migrant fisheries has tended to reiterate an old
truth: that the Popo in Pointe-Noire are a mixture of people of Ghanaian Ewe, Togolese
Mina and Béninois Xwla and Xweda origin. Although this once was the case, the
community must now be considered as composed almost exclusively of Xwla and
X weda people.
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on the beach and most of them are part-time fishermen. In addition 200-300
young Vili2 work with the Popo, of ten on a more or less occasional basis.
The best-known institution among the Popo is the male production unit,
commonly referred to as the "company".3 At present there are 107 units,
owing around 120 big canoes in addition to some smaller local dug-outs.
The units are owned either individually or collectively by Popo fishermen.
About half are individually owned.4 In collectively owned units the number
of owners varies from 2 to 8, where one always is referred to as its leader
or chief. About 40 per cent of the Popo fishermen in Pointe-Noire have
status as owners. Depending on the number of owners who actually go
fishing, units may ne ed additionallabour. The vast majority of companies
therefore employ a certain number of Popo workers who stay in different
types of client relationships, most often to the chief of company. The
workers represent the remaining 60 per cent of the adult male population.
Commonly the units also ne ed additional non-Popo labour and this is
supplied by the young ViIi. The latter are not clients in the same way as
the Popo workers, and they have much higher mobility in terms of
switching between different companies than in the former group. Hence, the
socio-economic composition of the companies varies considerably. At one
extreme there may be a unit where all members are Popo and owners;
another extreme would be where one Pop o owner works exclusively with
VilI labour. Both cases may be observed, but the great majority of units
have one or more Popo owners in addition to both Popo and ViIi workers.
Kinship relations between Pop o members in a company can always be
traced, although there is no specific kinship principle for recruitment of
members. Relations (among owners as well as between owners and
workers) seem to be fairly random and include agnatic, matrilineal as well
as in-Iaw relations (of ten several at the same time). Or a father may work
2 Many of the young ViIi are migrants like the Popo, coming from nearby Cabinda. The
group also includes people with Zaïrian nationality and Congolese of other ethnic
origins. They should in general not be considered as a uniform group. More or less
detailed descriptions of the ViIi and their fisheries are found in the same literature as that
dealing with the Popo in Pointe- N oire.
3 The use of the term "company" varies considerably in the literature on West African
canoe fisheries. Some authors use it for analytical purposes, giving it well defined
characteristics (see eg. Jorion 1988 and Atti Mama 1991). Gobert (e.g. 1985a) uses it to
distinguish collectively owned units from those owned individually. Both definitions are
problematie. Here the term wil simply be used to describe any Popo fishing unit. This
is also the way it is used by the Popo themselves.
4 One unit is owned by a Popo woman.
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together with friends and cousins, while his sons or brothers work in other
companies.
The companies sell their catch immediately after it has been landed on
the beach. By far the greatest part is sold to Popo women, according to
certain principles of division. The sale is considered the concern of all crew
members, and the internal share system is formally based on a 50-50 share
between means of production and labour. The owners take their part in the
labour share provided they participate in production. Accounts between
owners and workers are settled once a week, and no difference is made
among workers except for min or bonuses to the captain and the mechanic.
In cases of co-ownership the share of means of production is kept aside and
the co-owners occasionally meet (perhaps once a year) to decide how the
money should be used. Groups of owners often have their own treasurer(s)
and accountants, or the money is kept with the leader. The principles
behind owners' intern al rights are not easy to describe as they always will
tend to be defined contextually, although they can at times remind of the
formal principles in a modern shareholding enterprise (rights and interests
according to level of investments, etc).
Assets in the companies vary considerably, although we estimate that
FCF A 4 million5 is the minimum required to establIsh a viable unit. The
wealthiest companies may possess values in production equipment near
FCF A 20 million (new price), but the average is far less, probably
somewhere between 6 and 8 million.6 Canoes are always bought in Ghana
and transported to Pointe-Noire on liners, of ten after they have been
navigated to Benin. Nets and engines are sometimes bought in Congo, but
they may come from all over West Africa. No fisherman or group of fisher-
men wishing to establish a new unit will normally be able to provide the
necessary financial means by themselves. They always rely on support in
terms of some kind of credits.
Units are continuously being dissolved and recreated with new ownership
relations. One of the reasons is obviously that the management principles
give ample room for manipulation and conflicts, particularly since formal
accountancy knowledge is very limited among owners as well as among
workers. Furthermore, co-owners steadily seek to achieve higher social (and
economic) prestige through establishing themselves as chief of company.
5 At the time of study the fixed exchange rate was 50 FCF A= L FRF.
6 The figures are based on "official" prices and should be handled with great caution. In
real life people of ten find much cheaper ways of providing means of produetion.
However, in relative terms they giv e an approximate picture of the variations
encountered.
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With demersal gill net or line fishery, the social relations are different, in
that many workers themselves own nets or lines privately. Since not all
owners allow or are interested in this type of fishing and many workers do
not own theIr own gear, the formation of the crews changes completely. We
will not describe the share system for this fishery here,7 but only indicate
that demersal fisheries are relatively less interesting from the viewpoint of
the owners, compared to pelagic fisheries.
When the fish is sold on the beach the price is normally set by
Congolese traders early in the morning. However the majority of the catch
is sold to the wives of the crew members at a somewhat lower price (FCF A
500/20 kg) than what the market is willing to pay. In principle every
woman married to a crew member has the right to the same amount of fish
from the canoe of her hus band, but it is well known that it is an advantage
to be the wife of a company leader or at least of one of the owners.
Although many other factors influence marriage structures, this dilemma is
clearly reflected by the fact that 70 per cent of the Popo women are
maried to owners and that 60 per cent of the Popo workers remain without
a Popo wife in Pointe-Noire.
Each woman, whether she is the only wife or a co-wife, constitutes her
own economic unit. She has her own ovens for smoking the fish she buys
and her own staff of young Congolese helpers. 8 She then either sells the
fish herself in the town markets or sends the smoked fish by rail to
Congolese clients for sale in all the major population centres from Pointe-
Noire to Brazzaville. For every processor, access to pelagic fish is of major
concern.9 In order to increase her supplies she can buy pelagic fish from
a small industrial fleet or get access to fish in other canoes than that of her
husband by providing financial support through credits. Simple observations
on the beach of which women who receives fish in which companies,
demonstrate that many women operate as creditors in other units than that
of the husband. Information on the credit situation in a certain number of
fishing units indicates that Popo women in Pointe-Noire provide at least
half of all credits to the companies. Other creditors are of ten old well-
established owners and Congolese businessmen or civil servants with whom
some of the fishermen have special friendship relations. Fig. L gives an idea
7 The system is described eg by Chaboud 1982 p. 25, Gobert 1985b p. 255 and Makaya
1983. Minor changes in the system have occurred since then.
8 A thorough description of the smoking proeesses has been presented by Adrien (1981).
9 It is mostly pelagic fish which is smoked. Simple estimates of the profitability of
proeessing and trade of different speeies demonstrate that smoking of pelagic fish is by
far the most profitable option for Popo women.
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about the complexity of Popo credit relations. Credits often may go two
ways between the same persons. Each type of credit (whether credit from
processor to company owner, or from owner to workers/clients) has its own
rules and logic and within each type, the context remains important, as very
few credit relations are equal in terms of interests, repayment periods etc.
Figure L
Credit chart oriented from viewpoint of one Popo owner
and his two wives*
Outside the Pointe-Noire community
Inside the Pointe-Noire community
Owner 4
Owner 1
I Owner 5 i I Father Iin Benin
* The chart takes a specific case as its starting point, but has been somewhat modified in
order to demonstrate the variation in types of credits found.
The Pop O households in Pointe-Noire mainly function as reproduction
units. The overwhelming majority is based on marriages between Popo,
although there is no prohibition against Popo marrying a Congolese. The
marriage structure is polygynous and the maximum number of wives at the
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beach is four. Many fishermen also have wives living in their home vill age
and there is a certain mobility among the women between Congo and
Benin. To some extent this mobility is connected with the fact that many
couples choose to send their children to Benin for further schooling. The
age structure in the community shows a very clear deficit of young people
(particularly boys) between 15 and 25 years of age.
Husbands and wives work in different economic units, and they also keep
separate accounts where each contributes to household expenses. There is
great variation as to who contributes with what and how much. In such a
situation one could expect households to be of min or economic importance.
To some extent this is true, but spouses do exert important influence upon
each other' s economic activities. Investigations on credit demonstrate that
a woman who provides credits to fishermen, will almost without exception,
primarily provide loans to the company of her hus band. Furthermore a wife
can not dec ide on her economic dispositions completely independent of her
husband - particularly in relation to in-community economic transactions.
In some of the wealthiest households husband and wife operate de facto as
a corporate economic unit.
Another important feature is the fact that 36 per cent of the men, despite
of having reached normal marriage age, have not established their own
units.lO They are all workers and live single or as members in the
household of their patron.
For various purposes, the Popo in Pointe-Noire are organised according
to a system combining agnatic descent and village/territory of origin. This
we may term, simplIfying matters somewhat, the extended family
system. 
II The system is intimately connected to Popo religious ways of
thought. Extended family identity is defined according to commonly agreed
genealogies which trace descent six to eight generations back, and to myths
which connect the lineage to certain mythical forefathers in the more
general and extended pantheon of the voodoos. Lineage voodoos and other
forefathers may intervene actively in everyday life to give protection and
support against other voodoos or living persons who seek to attack another
person or render li fe difficult. Protection is most efficiently sought from
those with whom an individual is identified and with whom some people
in the group have direct means of communication. Forefathers and voodoos
10 Many of them may have wives in Benin, but they are not in a position to bring them
along.
11 Although agnatie lineage dominates as the organising principle in Popo kinship
organisation, there are so many modifications to this, that it would be misleading to use
the term lineage to describe it, thus the looser term "extended family".
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are intimately linked to territories, and in Benin the distribution of access
to land and waters is closely related to line age identity. However since
people from different lineages often live in the same areas, collaboration
between forefathers is important and besides, some voodoos are connected
to a territory more than to lineages.
The extended families are not formal political fora with leaders who are
elected and easily identifiable. The way they work is always contextually
defined. It is the nature of the matter to be handled which defines who
become involved in solving it. The broader and more serious a matter is,
the higher is the level at which it is treated. Jf it concerns affairs between
patrilineal cousins, only the immediate family will be involved, and if it is
a minor affaIr between two persons of different lineages the problem may
be solved without mobilising the whole extended family. Leadership is
based on seniority and formal decisions are always taken by men.
Only the most important matters are taken to the top of the hierarchy
which classifies the Popo community into three main segments, of ten
referred to as "the three communities". One involves those who come from
the vill age of Gbéfa (Agonékamé) and other neighbouring villages in Grand
Popo; its members are almost exclusively Xwla. The second group includes
people from nine villages located on the inner side of the lagoons stretching
from Grand Pop o towards the Ouidah lagoon. In this group people are
claiming both Xwla and Xweda descent. The third and least segmented part
is constituted exclusively by X weda from Ouidah town or the villages in
the southern end of Lac Ahémé.
Matters like birth, mariage and death are always a concern of the
extended family. In Pointe-Noire it is the extended family which regulates
relations between the fishermen and their kin in Benin. One easily
observable example is the death of close kin living in Benin. In such cases,
the leaders of the concerned segments will allow the dependents to organise
a ceremony of money collection to help the family at home. All adult
members of the segment are in principle obliged to contribute at least
FCFA 1000.12 People from the other segments may also contribute, but
12 There are no direct sanctions against someone who does not participate. However, in
cases of deaths in the family of someone who does not participate, the segment may
refuse to organise a siinlar ceremony. One of the segments has even elaborated written
regulations concerning which kin in Benin are "eligible" for ceremonies and who in
Pointe-Noire should participate.
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that is more voluntarily. Such collection ceremonies are frequently
organised and may include as many as three or four in one week.13
In addition, the extended families organise a range of different religious
ceremonies which are important parts of Popo life abroad. Community
members outside the family in question participate in great numbers.
Information on when to organise certain ceremonies comes from the family
elders in Benin and then implemented by the elders in Pointe-Noire. The
extended families are also in volve d in matters related to all types of intern al
conflicts in the Popo community. However, as will be demonstrated below,
other institutions are far more influential in this respect.
In addition to the family system, but also largelyas an integral part of
it, political li fe in the Popo community is dominated by an institution
generally referred to as T Association des Ressortissants BENINOIS'
(ARB). Formally ARB appears as a sort of voluntary association for all
Béninois residents in Pointe-Noire. It has a general board of elected men
with background in trade as well as fishing and it has close connections to
the newly established Benin Consulate in the town. At the beach however,
ARB is organised with its own locally elected boards in the two fishing
villages and where only the fishing community is concemed. This separate
branch of ARB (ARB-B) has its own regulations and rules,14 besides
having functions far more comprehensive than what is found in the
community of Béninois as such.15 ARB-B is the dominant institution at
the beach in relation to the following tasks:
a) All external relations conceming the general situation of the Popo
fishermen in Congo. This mainly involves to contacts with
representatives from local units in the administration, like immgration,
customs, port authorities, police and others, but includes also the
relations to the ViIi fishermen and to representatives of the Congolese
residents in the fishing villages. Maintaining good relations to the
Congolese community also includes the organisation of intern al
13 Estimates based on the public accounts of twenty of these ceremonies indicate that
perhaps as much as FCF A 30 million or more is collected annually in the Popo
community in Pointe-Noire for these purposes. However, probably not more than one
fourth is actually sent to Benin. As a general rule the remaining three fourths seem to
be spent on ceremony costs (about 50 per cent) and the remainder is more or less
secretly kept by the immediate family in Pointe-Noire.
14 The well-known written regulations of 1967 have already been presented both by
Makaya 1983 and Nguinguiri 1991.
15 The fishing population represents close to 2/3 of the total Béninois population in the
town.
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collections of money for Congolese charity purposes or purposes
related to beach infrastructure. The different contacts are sometimes
handled through ARB in town, but are more frequently established
directly by the fishermen.
b) ARB-B has both legislative, judicial and executive powers related to
the intern al social order of the community. Phenomena like public
disturbance, theft, fighting, adultery and offenses related to various
other aspects of community life are regulated subject to sanctions by
the ARB-B leadership. In the most serious cases people are repatriated,
sometimes at the expense of the community. Probably some 20 Popo
men or more have been forced to leave the community over the past
10 years.
In cases where members offend or come into open conflict with
people from the Congolese community or with Government authorities,
ARB-B will normally have a role to playeither as defender, or
mediator, or simply by taking over the case and passing intern al
judgement.
c) It is involved in all matters concerning the safety and socIal security
of community members. This is illustrated through its role in
coordinating rescue operations at sea when canoes are missing and in
an intern al system of money collection to repatriate members who fall
seriously ill. Travel costs are in such instances covered by the
community. Jf a person dies in Congo a similar system exists for
covering funeral costs. All money collection organised by ARB- B is
compulsory.
d) ARB-B also plays a major role in regulating and judging in internal
conflicts of a more economic nature. Generally these conflicts concern
disputes between production units over the control of Popo labour,
internal conflicts between owners and workers or pure economic
conflicts between co-owners or in credit relations. In order to fulfil this
judicial function a system of ten referred to as "the transparency" has
been established. This implies that major economic transactions or
agreements always take place with the presence of a person
"accepted"16 as an ARB-B witness.
16 Acceptance is misleading in the meaning of formally appointed people. However, the
community knows perfectly well which persons are acceptable or not.
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ARB-B involvement in intern al economic matters normally requires
that one of the parties in the conflict requests that the case be brought
before it. In most cases such conflicts are handled and resolved within
the extended family system. ARB-B regulations concerning economic
transactions are far more particularistic in character than what is
generally the basis for conflict solving within the family system. In
simplified terrns, we may say that for ARB- B an economic trans action
is an economic trans action independent of the other statuses held by
the persons involved. A consequence of this is that fishermen consider
ARB-B jurisdiction to be more based on rules rather than on achieving
compromise as is of ten considered to be the case within extended
families.
One of the most striking aspects concerning ARB-B is the very high degree
of authority it exercises. Once a decision has been reached (that may in
many instances take time) it is generally carried out promptly. There do not
seem to exist many possibilities for members to escape ARB-B jurisdietion.
In money collections, ARB-B's own population register shows that 97 or
98 per cent of the population contributes, and estimates based on the same
sources for 1991 and 92 indicate that ARB-B collects more than FCFA 5
million annually.17 Investigations of verdicts in economic conflicts show
that a person sentenced to settle his or her debt generally does so quickly,
although the sums in question may be considerable. Even indirectly ARB-B
manages to impose its authority. Although economic conflicts most of ten
find a solution at the level of the extended family, fishermen say that ARB-
B' s more particularistic regulations have influenced and modified the way
the families solve such conflicts. The fact that any person in principle can
demand to have his case judged by the ARB-B, provided he has followed
the principle of transparency, has forced family elders to take the ARB-B
regulations into consideration and more or less employ them in their search
for viable solutions.
Thus it becomes evident that ARB can not be considered a voluntary
organisation. Its power is omnipresent and includes every Popo living on
the beach irrespective of whether he or she lbelongs to' the organisation or
not. In many ways ARB-B must be considered as an integrated part and the
highest level of the extended family system. The only way for a Popo to
17 Our estimates show the following annual distribution of money collected:
Congolese purposes: 800,000 FCFA
Repatriations: 2,000,000 "
Funerals: 3,000,000 "
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escape its control is to move out of its control area. A study of the intern al
power basis of ARB- B shows that, in terms of lineage identity, the
organisation is based on full representation and consensus or at least an
overwhelming majority. However, in terms of socio-economic statuses the
association is completely dominated by the owners. External institutions,
like ARB in town and the Béninois Ministry of Foreign Affairs through the
Consulate, also have important influence on the politics of ARB at the
beach.
From the above description we may conclude that the Popo community
must be considered as an internally strong, well-organised socIal entity
where economic, political and religious institutions are adapted to a
particular type of migrant life. It has also be en shown that relations to
individuals and institutions external to the Pointe-NoIre community are
numerous and in some instances crucIal for the survival of the unit.
Relations to the Congolese authorities are a clear example, but also
relations to people in Benin emerge as an integrated part of the social
system. AIr traffic between Pointe-NoIre and Cotonou is extensive, with
often as many as 20-30 Popo either coming or leaving in the same week,
indicating that close contacts with people in the home areas are considered
both necessary and interesting. Out of a total of 87 owners in the 41
companies in the northern of the two beach villages, only 71 of them live
in Congo. The remaining 16 have retired and now live in Benin, either in
their vill age of origin or near Cotonou.
Even though many community members have not seen their home
country for a very long time (in some cases as much as 15 years) there can
be no doubt that the Popo's objective in staying abroad is to be able one
day to return to Benin with sufficient means to live materially at ease for
the rest of their lives. However, the realism of this intention may in many
cases be questioned. Studies among those who already have returned home
show that most of them have done so either because of illness or because
they realised that they would never become rich and left before they
became too poor to afford the return fare. Others have left because the
community forced them to. Only a minority of those who have returned
may be said to be wealthy persons. This is however, another matter; what
is important in this respect is that the Popo fishermen, to a large extent, live
and continuously make their dispositions with a vie w to return home in
honour.
So far we have treated contacts to Benin as an simple home-abroad
relation. More detailed studies show a need to differentiate if we are to
understand what is meant by "Benin" in this context. The home area, the
Lower Mono, is today a region hard hit by problems related to severe
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population pressure and ecological deterioration. Land in the area is saline
and unfertile and rivers and lagoons which earlier produced great quantities
of fish, shellfish and mollusc (see e.g. Gruvel 1913) appear heavily
overfished to the extent that no-one can make aliving exclusively relying
on these resources. A visit to some of the villages also demonstrates that
much of the population lIves and works outside the area, in Benin as well
as in a range of other West and Central African countries. The migrant
fishermen probably represent only a minority of Popo migrants.
Relations of the migrants (whether they are Xwla or Xweda) to their
villages are characterised in different ways. The most common feature is
that a migrant Popo is expected as soon as possible, to construct a house
of concrete in his home village. As a result, in some villages there are now
more concrete houses than there are inhabitants to live in them. The
construction of a house is mainly a symbolic act demonstrating attachment
to home as well as success abroad. To demonstrate attachment to home is
important in that it shows respect and affection for the forefathers and their
territories. In order to have their protection, this symbolic act is crucial. To
some extent it is within the same perspective we must understand why
children are sent home for schooling and training. This is also linked in
with the fact that the Pop o fishermen wish a better and a different future
for their children, not in the home areas but through schooling and thereby
carriers in other sectors of society. Most other relations to the families at
home concern questions related to birth, mariage and death. Very few
relations of migrants to people in their home villages directly concern theIr
economic life abroad. The only exception is labour recruitment to the
companies, which takes place at this level. This, however, is not to say that
these relations are of min or economic importance. As just mentioned,
religion and ideology continue to be an integral part of the Popo production
in Congo, even though it has not been possible to quantify the importanee
of the flow of money from Popo in Pointe-Noire to kinsmen at home,
beyond what has already been done in the case of collective money
collections for deceased kino
In Pointe-Noire the fishermen also relyon the home country for a series
of other services. Canoes must be bought in Ghana and transported to
Congo, as well as other equipment like engines, nets, etc. Besides, those
with enough money often wish to invest, particularly in real estate, in order
to secure their return to the country. Every owner or group of owners
therefore has a network of "confidants" in Benin dealing with this type of
economic affairs. But confidants tend not to be close family members. Most
of them live in or near Cotonou and are ideally people with some economic
interests in Pointe-Noire. Retired owners are crucial as confidants, but also
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other relations exist. Such combinations of interests give people a certain
mutual control in economic transactions which always are considered
delicate and risky and where numerous stories are told about how fishermen
have been fooled. There are no institutions like the ARB- B which can
handle such insecurity in the Benin/Congo relations. The family system or
the formal judicial system of the state are both considered inefficient and
ill-suited for this type of transactions.
The description just presented raises a range of questions. Some of those
which will be dealt with later and which are connected to the development
of the Pointe-Noire community are: How did the Popo produetion system
and the various institutions develop? Who controls what in the Popo
community and how are power and authority established, exercised and
maintained? How has the role of women in economic transactions become
so important, and what have been the consequences? In attempting to find
answers to these questions we hope that they also will contribute to the
more general understanding of Popo fishery in Congo.
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3. Why are the Popo in Pointe-Noire?
One of the most widely circulated explanations which also seems to have
had an impact on explaining West African migrant fisheries in general, is
found in the works of PJ.M. Jorion (1985 a and b and 1988). In analysing
two specialisation processes in West African canoe fisheries (those of the
Xwla and the Ghanaian Anlo Ewe), Jorion emphasises ecological deteriora-
tion and social marginalisation (loss of access to resources) in the home
areas as key factors for understanding why people turn from part-time
lagoon fishery combined with horticulture and salt produetion, to full-time
open sea fisheries. Based on assumptions borrowed from individual risk
avoidance theories, Jorion' s argument leads to a general conclusion con-
cerning specialisation in fisheries: "no one ever becomes a full time mari-
time fisherman other than under duress; necessity and necessity alone can
force anyone to exercise such a tough, dangerous and economically risky
activity" (1988 pp. 152-3). Geographical mobility (either as seasonal moves
or more permanent migrations) hence appears as a new and alternative
measure to minimise economic risks. When one is deprived of land "diver-
sifcation of occupations becomes impossible and risk minimisation
strategies ne ed to take an altogether diferent direction: mobility in follow-
ing the fish wherever they go" (ibid.). According to Jorion, the Popo in
Pointe-Noire are there a) as a result of their loss of land at home and b) as
a reflection of a new risk minimisation strategy "exiling oneself for a time
under more favourable skies, where fish are plenty and buyers rich" (ibid).
I have elsewhere (Jul-Larsen 1992) argued that phenomena like ecologic
deterioration constitute an element important for understanding the develop-
ment of West African canoe fisheries. However, like is the case in Jorion's
w ork, there is a considerable danger in focusing solelyon certain specific
explanatory aspects to the exclusion of others. The result is that far too
simplified pictures of specific change processes are created, and the debate
becomes dominated by generalisations far from reality and with little
explanatory value. Jorion's empirical analysis of the Xwla demonstrates
serious weaknesses. Despite the interesting and valuable data presented, his
analysis tends sometimes to be tautological or it is unclear, and generally
a-historie since historical proeesses from very different time- periods are
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taken to explain the same phenomenon.1 It would be useful to confront
Jorion' s general conclusions with what historicalliterature and the case of
the Pointe-Noire fishermen may tell us on this question.
The available literature on the history of the peoples of the Lower
Mon02 points to the close cultural, political and socio-economic relations
existing among the so-called Aja peoples3 throughout the last 500 years.
With an internally agreed and recognised common descent and a commonly
shared religion-conceptual universe, the various tribes which constitute the
Aja nucleus have a history characterised by interdependenee more than by
distinctiveness, despite different geographical areas of dominance and
historical phases where one or more groups have exerted political
dominance at the expense of the others. In the Lower Mono, the Danxomé
kingdom of the Fon people which lasted from the beginning of the 18th
century until the French colonisation in the 1890s, probably represents the
most important of these phases even though most of the Lower Mono area
lies outside what is generally conceived to have been under Danxome
territorial control (Manning 1982). It is noteworthy that the Xweda, after
the defeat of their kingdom against Fon expansion in 1727, maintained
certain religious functions and a politico-religious authority in relation to
all of the Aja peoples through the entire period of Fon political domination;
functions and authority which continue to be of relevanee today.
During the time of Danxomé the economic development in the region
was characterised, first by the expansion in slave export, later substituted
by palm-oil exports and increased trade and commercialisation of imported
as well as local produees. This affected the X wla and the X weda just as
much as it affected the Fon, although not necessarily in the same way. The
economic development in the Lower Mono must be viewed within this
regional con text and not, like J orion tends to do, on the basis of production
in what he calls the "subsistence economy" of the Lower Mono.
As mentioned by Jorion, work migrations among the Xwla are not of
new date. There is evidence of such migrations at least as far back as the
For a critique of a different kind and connected to changes in the Anlo Ewe fisheries,
see Nukunya 1989.
2 See e.g. aricles of Karl-Augustt, Merlo & Vidaud, Wilson and others in de Medeiros
1984.
3
Two traditions of historians speak either of the Aj a- Tado gro up (Tado being the vilage
of common descent) or the Aja-Ewe group. The latter include the different Ewe peoples
(and also to some extent the Mina) in the nucleus, while the former delimits the nucleus
to peoples like the Aja, Aïzo, Gun, Fon, Xwla, Xweda, Toffin, Watchi and others. These
are the ones who are considered to descend from the Aja people in Tado in the 16th and
17th centuries.
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early 18th century. From the Ghanaian Fante, some of whom settled in
what became known as Petit Popo (Anécho) and later became the Mina, the
X w la learned to cross the coastal surf and soon became known as
competent canoemen loading and unloading European vessels, not only in
Grand Popo, but also in most of the other stations or factories along the
Slave Coast. Unfortunately, we lack data on the number of people involved
in this business. Patrick Manning (1985 and 89) has shown that, with the
steady growth in trade and commercialisation during the last century, both
Xwla and Xweda also came to play a crucial role as canoe transporters in
a lagoon transport system which developed in parallel to the open sea
transport. Manning has estimated that by the end of the century, as many
as 10,000 men (mainly Xwla, but also Xweda) were involved in this
business in the whole of the Bight of Benin, 5,000 of them operating within
the frontiers of present-day Benin (1985, p. 62). This leads him to consider
all the coastal communities in Benin as part of a much broader regional
system (1989). In addition many of the coastal people were probably also
involved in the transportation of salt4 northwards towards the savannah
(Manning 1985). Manning's work clearly demonstrates that virtually all
Xwla and an important number ofXweda families must have been involved
in work migration by the end of the 19th century.
Equally interesting as the scale of Popo work migration is what Manning
tells about the organisation of the lagoon transport business. He quotes the
agronomi st Savariau from 1906: "Il existe dans tous les centres importants
riverains des lagunes ou des cours d' eau de véritables corporations de
piroguiers ayant chaqune un chef auquel les intèressés s'adressent ... ,,5
and concludes that "Among the boatmen, three labour systems coexisted.
The lineage system ... the slave system ...1 and) the wage system" (1985,
pp.71-2). Although we should be cautious about drawing firm conclusions
on the organisation of work in migration, it seems reasonable to assurne
that work-migration combined with alternative ways of organising
production (compared to the horticultural, fish and salt producing activities
in the lagoon villages at home), must have been a well known phenomenon
and an economic strategy commonly practised among the Pop o for at least
more than a century.
The lagoon transport system collapsed in the early years of this century,
mainly as a result of increased competition from roads and rail, after the
colonial conquest. But new opportunities also emerged. The construetion of
4 Salt has for centuries been produced locally in great quantities by the Xwla, but at the
turn of the century imported salt was probably the most common.
5 Quoted from Manning 1985, p.59.
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piers in the main ports meant an ongoing demand for loaders/unloaders, and
the Popo now switched in their external occupations away from the lagoon
transport towards work at the piers. Manning (1989, p.251) states that the
labour requirements were considerably reduced as a result of this change.
This certainly must have been true, although not necessarily as much as
Manning seems to indicate. He only mentions the pier in Cotonou as the
option to turn to (see also Pliya 1980, p.98). However, personal accounts
from Xwla and Xweda fishermen both in Pointe-Noire and in Benin show
that Cotonou only was one among several options. Jf we shall believe what
numerous Popo told this author, Xwla canoemen were present in large
numbers in the ports of Accra, Lomé and Lagos. Unfortunately little is
known about the internal organisation of this work migration, but the
fishermen relate that there were specific Popo individuals who had
specialised as a kind of work-broker between the port companies and the
Popo looking for work abroad, in each of the ports.6 At the same time
others, both Xwla and Xweda from are as a bit further inland had started to
migrate in order to fish in the lagoons stretching from Anlo in Ghana in the
west to Lagos and Nigeria in the east, and in freshwaters like on the Volta
River and even far north on the Niger River.7
Just as with lagoon transport system at the turn of this century, migration
to the piers came to an abrupt end with the construetion of the modern
ports. In the course of a 15 year-period from 1955 an important economic
opportunity was reduced to virtually niL. A vast majority of the older Popo
in Pointe-Noire as well as the fathers of the younger ones had - for longer
or shorter periods of their lives - been engaged in the work at the piers.
Just as theIr fathers and grandfathers in great numbers had switched from
lagoon transport migration to work at the piers, the older Popo in Pointe-
Noire (and certainly in many other places) were force d to seek new
opportunities when work at the piers came to a halt.
One alternative would have been to withdraw from migration and settle
permanently at home, but this option was severely constrained by another
proeess that was taking place at about the same time. Despite little "hard"
data, there can be no doubt that since the 1950s8 the Lower Mono has
6 See also Manning 1982, p.144 and Gutkind 1989 pp.364-5.
7
A relatively important community of Pop o is stil reported located on the Niger River
near Malanvile (Lucien Zannou. personal communication).
8 The deterioration proeess probably started earlier, but most people seem to agree that the
crisis was accentuated in the 1950s. See Pliya 1980. It has not been part of this study
to seek the causes of this deterioration, which. was probably due to a combination of
many complex proeesses.
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experienced a severe deterioration of its main natural resources, particularly
the lagoon and river/lake fish stocks, and also to some extent arable land.
Many authors (e.g. Surgy 1966, Houdenou 1971 and Pliya 1980) have
emphasised on this deterioration process in explaining the increase in
migrating fishermen. It would, of course, only be logical for worsened
conditions in the Lower Mono to lead more people to seek new opportuni-
ties outside the area.
During the first half of this century the Popo also learned to fish in open
seas. The first sea-fishing Anlo Ewe companies arrived in the Lower Mono
from Keta probably during the second decade where they established
seasonal fishing camps with the approval of the local population, who had
not yet exploited the resources of the sea. As time passed, these Ewe
seasonal camps of ten became more or less permanent (PlIya 1980, Jorion
1985a, Nukunya 1989).9 Many Popo investigated and experimented in
these opportunities and started moving along the coast, first in seasonal
moves. In Nigeria they were numerous as early as in the 1940s, perhaps
even earlier. Work at the piers did not impede such experimentation, as pier
work was generally limited to a few years at a time combined with longer
or shorter periods at home. Later some Popo chose to take up more long-
distance migration. In Pointe-Noire the first Popo must have arrived
between 1955 and 1958. According to Dhont (1963) there were 10
Dahomeyans at the beach in 1962. However, it was only some years later,
from mid-1960s, that work at the piers disappeared completely and large
numbers of people began to orient themselves towards becoming migrating
maritime fishermen. Contrary to what many authors seem to think, many
of the Popo in Pointe-Noire (particularly among the Xweda) had no or very
lIttle previous experience of sea fisheries on arrival. Gobert s reference
(1985b p. 251) to 23 company chiefs in Pointe-Noire where 10 of them are
quoted as having been fishing in 9 different countries outside Benin before
coming to Congo, supports the general argument of migration as a well
establIshed institution in Popo life. However, it is less certain whether they
actually had that much experience from sea fisheries abroad. My own
discussions with the same company owners reveal that many of them in
fact had not been in these countries in order to do sea-fishing, but rather
fishing in the lagoons and/or working at the piers.
The establishment process of the first Pop o in Pointe-Noire from 1964
and onwards are also interesting in this respect. Again - contrary to the
9 The Anlo Ewe in Benin which in many cases have settled and taken Béninois citizenship
are referred to as Keta. As shown in the previous section we also find some of them in
Pointe Noire.
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general interpretation - specialisation in sea fisheries was not an automatic
implication of theIr establishing themselves in Congo. The economic
activities undertaken by the Popo up until about 1969 was in fact
characterised by variation. The increase in Popo, mainly Xwla from the
beaches or the lagoons around Grand Popo, was slow and their number did
probably not exceed 50 men and two or three women in the summer of
1969. None of them arrived with sea-fishing equipment; they all started by
buying or renting small ViIi canoes from the local fishermen, which they
used mainly for the same type of fishing as the local Congolese population,
whether in the immediate shore areas, in the lagoons or the rivers. Thus,
although Pointe-Noire served as a kind of pivot centre, many of the Pop o
stayed for shorter or longer periods in areas far away from the town, both
along the coast as well as somewhat further inland. They experimented with
many different types of work including trade, crafts and agriculture
combined with lagoon or sea fishing near the shore.lO As late as in the
mid-1970s at least four or five Popo fishermen still remained in the coastal
areas north of Pointe-Noire, around the Conkouati lagoon dose to the
Gabonese border and in the Loango bay, practising a local ViIi type of
fishery combined with other productive activities.
When the Popo arived, they already knew about the possibilities and
potentials in specialised open sea fisheries, as practised by other West
Africans before their arivaL. From the late 1940s a community dominated
by Ghanaian Anlo- Ewe fishermen, but also including a certain number of
X w la and X weda, had developed a specialised open sea fishery carried out
in combination with other types of fisheries from the same beach.ll This
community was completely dissolved in November 1962 when political un-
rest in Congo led to the expulsion of virtually all its members. Very few
of the Popo from the pre-1962 community returned to Pointe-Noire later,
but their open sea fishing was well known among the new group of
migrants.12
It was only in 1967 that the first Ghanaian canoe was ordered and
equipped with outboard engine and drift nets, and two more years passed
10 Going to sea in the area around Point-Noire is very different from in Benin, as there is
very httle surf many places in the bays of Pointe-Noire and Loango.
11 For a description of the first West African fishing community, see Rossignol 1955,
Vennetier 1958, 1965 and undated, Dhont and Stauch 1962, and Dhont 1963.
12 The literature on the Popo in Pointe Noire has not differentiated between the two West
African communities, seeing the development from the 1940s until today as a continuous
evolution (see eg. Nguinguiri 1991b). There are however few reasons to do so, and the
Popo of today all consider 1964 as the star of their history in Congo.
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be fore the great majority opted to invest in this type of fishery. That the
new fishermen did not immediately invest in open sea fisheries is probably
due to several factors, like lack of capital as well as general caution with
reg ard to political stability in the country. However, in relation to Jorion's
argument above, the actual course of the establishment proeess demon-
strates that specialised open sea fisheries was only one of several options
originally open to the Popo. For them, specialisation was not a "logical"
result of migration; on the contrary, specialisation followed as one of
several options after they had established themselves in the new country.
There is nothing to indicate that they were forced into open sea fishery.
They could probably have continued a ViIi type of part-time fishery similar
to that they had practised in the lagoons of Grand Popo.
We find considerable variation in the relations the Popo fishermen in
Pointe-Noire had to theIr home villages at the time of their arival in the
1960s and early 70s. There are cases which clearly show that some
migrants were in trouble and had few possibilities to make a living at
home.13 However, as many or even more of them would have had few
problems in taking up normal village li fe in Benin if they so desired. Many
of the Popo in Pointe-Noire belong to important families and lineages with
considerable territorial rights. In Benin, individually held fishing places of
numerous of the Congolese residents, were located and many of the most
influential people now living in the Lower Mono have previously lived and
worked abroad.
Thus, it seems reasonable to conclude that there were many causes
behind the migration of Popo fishermen which accelerated sharply in the
1960s and 70s. Certainly, the causes are much more complex than simply
a result of the marginalisation of people in home areas due to ecological
deterioration. TheIr establishment in Congo and the turn towards full-time
marine fishing among the Popo can certainly not be explained as exclu-
sivelya question of "duress", as Jorion argues. Other factors are probably
more significant; in order to understand them we need to reinterpret
(compared to Jorion's interpretation) the role played by work migrations,
both economically as well as culturally within the communities of the X wla
and X weda. There is no evidence in the historie al literature that work
migrations developed as a consequence of people losing access to resources
13 Among those, many were found to have "sold" their usufruct fishing rights in lagoons
or rivers to others in order to pay for the preparations and the ticket. These rights may
probably be returned to the person in question, provided he can return the money he
originally was given, but we have no evidence of such reappropriations having taken
place.
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at home by losing rights to the territories of their lineage. Nor is there any
evidence that work migration as such has at any stage in history led
migrants to become detached from the economic and cultural life of their
home villages in the way Jorion seems to argue. On the contrary, work
migration connected to possibilIties within the broader regional economic
systems of Aja peoples seems to have been a common economic strategy
and a more or less integrated part of the Xwla and Xweda social organisa-
tion for centuries. It first developed in connection to increased trade
contracts between the coastal and the northern savannah areas and the
presence of the Europeans. Later it changed according to the economic
policies of the colonial power and since the 1960s, work migrations have
been adapted to fit the post-colonial political scene. Migration has always
been combined with longer stays at home and, when age prevents produc-
tive work abroad, the final return to the home village. In this respect
migration has appeared as a means to increase an individual' s personal
standing and this together with increased economic possibilities can give
authority and power in the home communities. Work on the "outside" in
order to bring assets to the "inside" have been integrated in Pop o social
order and have functioned as a means to support and reproduce the
features of the Xwla and the Xweda societies in the Lower Mono as such.
Seen in this perspective, the move to Congo and the turn towards
specialised maritime fishing become perfectly understandable. Work abroad
is primarilya means to realise wealth which can be transferred back to the
home community and converted into economic, polItical and religious
"projects" there. Migration which does not produce tangible results to be
converted in the home community therefore in a sense becomes meaning-
less from this perspective. The migration to Congo (and elsewhere) which
accelerated in the early 1960s is first of all a reflection of the sudden
disappearance of other migrating opportunities, reinforced by the problems
of ecologic deterioration at home. Once established abroad, for the Popo the
main question became to find a mode of work which as effectively as
possible reflected the logic of their migration system. Part-time fishing
similar to the mode of life in the Lower Mono was certainly not appropriate
for this purpose, and other opportunities in trade and craft production were
probably limited and very different from what the Popo had been doing
before. On the other hand, both the pre-1962 experience as well as
experiments undertaken by some of them after 1967, showed promising
results well suited to the social "needs" of the Popo. Although the destiny
of their predecessors also had demonstrated the insecurity connected to
investing considerable sums abroad; in 1969 the option must have appeared
sufficiently promising. Besides, there were other ways to reduce the risks
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of a repetition of the 1962 events. The remaining part of this paper seeks
to indicate how this happened.
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4. A new production system and
consolidation of the community:
Developments in the 1970s
The period from 1969 until 1977 was characterised by a considerable and
accelerated growth in the Popo population. It started in autumn 1969, when
the arival of some 60 Popo men more than doubled the male population.
During the 1970s the figure continued to increase. In 1973 there were 164
(Niel 1973) and in 1976 a survey done by the Port authorities in Pointe-
Noire counted 470 Popo fishermen (Nguinguiri 1991b). The number of
Ghanaian canoes shows a similar increase. In 1970, 24 canoes are reported
(Samba 1970); this figure had reached 45 by 1973 (NielI973) and around
120 by 1976. The presence of women is not given much attention in the
literature. From our own investigations we know that not more than five
Popo women lived at the beach in 1971,1 and according to the fishermen
themselves the number of women startedto increase only around 1973. In
1981 their number is reported to be 243 (Adrien 1981),2 but this figure is
not automatically comparable with the others since there had been a
repatriation of the Popo in September 1977 which led to an immediate
decrease. However on the basis of interviews the adult women population
in 1977 is estimated to number between 200 and 300 individuals.
The total dominance of X wla and the X weda was strengthened during the
1970s. Although the main shift of origin and particularly the disappearance
of the Anlo Ewe was a direct result of 1962 repatriation,3 Mina fishermen
returned to Pointe-Noire about at the same time as the Xwla. Among the
164 fishermen surveyed by Niel in 1973, he reports that 153 are from
Benin, 10 from Togo and only one is Ghanaian. Three years later in the
These women were named by several fishermen who already lived or arrived Pointe
Noire that year.
2 The figure includes only Popo fish smokers. Although some few women may not be
included, it may be used for demographie purposes.
3 Dhont reported (1963) the following background of the fishermen in 1962: Ghanaians
34, Togoleses 21 and Dahomeyans 10. There is no need here to discuss the fact that
these figures are not automatically coherent with those presented by Venetier (1958) four
years earlier.
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Congolese port authority survey, the number of Togolese was reduced to
eight (and no Ghanaians) while the presence of Béninois had tripled. Since
then, the number of Mina companies and fishermen has continued to
decrease, with only one company and two fishermen left at present.
The growth of the Popo was almost exclusively based on their
specialisation in open sea fishery which started in the years immediately
prior to 1969. It may be worthwhile to investigate in some detail the
patterns of recruitment which emerged in this first phase. Before the
specialisation process accelerated, most of the Popo collaborated in small
groups of two or three persons. Generally these groups consisted of people
who had decided to migrate together; groups were often based on friendship
rather than on formal relations of kinship. Confronted with the investment
and labour needs required in order to operate an open sea canoe - this
demanded considerable sums of money and 5 to 6 persons as a minimum
- the switch towards open sea fisheries did not lead to increased
collaboration among the first residents. What happened was that each of the
original groups sought an enlarged collaboration by calling for additional
members in Benin. From the activities among the first Popo in the years
between 1967 to 1969, we can see that representatives of virtually all the
original groups revisited Benin, even though many of them had only just
arrived. It has not been possible to identify the exact number of original
work groups in the 1960s; but on the basis of the number of fishermen as
well as the number of Ghanaian canoes which emerged in the late 1960s,
we assurne that about 20 groups existed.
Case studies show that each of the groups mainly sought two things
when revisiting Benin. One was money to finance the company; the other
was sufficient additional labour to operate it.4 To a certain extent funds
were found in the extended family system, but since money was scarce and
Congo was far away, two or three persons were seId om able to raise
enough. A common solution seems to have been to combine the two
different needs by inviting new members still in Benin to invest with them
in co-ownership. In addition a certain number of younger men willing to
join as labourers were included. This recruitment pattern is most probably
the immediate cause of the heavy "invasion" of Popo men to Pointe-Noire
autumn 1969. To a certain extent, it was combined with the Klondyke
syndrome of "great opportunities in the south" which also led to the
establishment of companies among people who had never been to Congo
4 In addition they had to make practical arrangements in order to buy canoes in Ghana as
well as other equipment which was scarce in Congo.
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before. Many of the companies of X weda from Lac Ahémé and Ouidah are
examples of this effect.
No data exist as to how many companies existed around 1970, but we
must assurne that since none of them - or at least only some very few -
had more than one canoe at the outset, the total number must have been
close to 24, equivalent to the reported number of canoes. Jf the adult male
population was around 100-110 this implies that there were approximately
4 Popo fishermen per canoe or slightly more than it is today (3.45). We can
therefore assurne that, already from the beginning, the newly established
units must have had sufficient manpower to operate and that there was no
need to increase their number. Besides, already very early in the 1970s
ARB-B established mechanisms aimed at reducing of the number of new-
comers. All the same, the number of canoes grew very fast and more or
less proportionally with the number of men during the 1970s. Jf the
companies had sufficient manpower to operate, and ARB-B tended to limit
the establishment of newcomers, there is a ne ed to investigate why the
community still gre w so rapidly.
In order to understand the underlying factors of the growth, we ne ed to
focus on the organisation of the companies. In 1970 virtually all the
companies were co-owned with a leader who generally was the man who
had taken the initiative to create it. The gro up of co-owners were, as we
have noted, only loosely connected through kinship, and the "rules" of
authority and the sharing of assets and profits were new and floating.5 Not
unlike today, the potential danger of economic conflicts among co-owners
was considerable. For such reasons, but mainly because of the whole social
logic behind migration as described above, most of the "younger" co-
owners were eager to establish their own units where they themselves could
figure as company chief.
These two elements - the search towards increased social standing and
economic control - are crucial factors for understanding the particular
dynamism of the population growth in the 1970s. Fig. 2 shows a typical
case of company development from its creation in 1969 until today. We can
note the pattern of continuous fissions, which means that out of the fIrst
company with one canoe and six owners created in 1969 (on the basis of
5 Companies based on co-ownership is rather unique among the West African migrant
fishermen. No references in literature have been found indicating similar arrangements
elsewhere. Companies in Ghana or Senegal seem to be individually owned. It is
interesting though that the quotation from Savariau (see p.19) indicates that lagoon
transport canoes in Benin at the beginning of this century may have been operated under
similar conditions.
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two persons who already had arrived in 1966), there exist today nine
companies with twelve canoes owned by fourteen men. For each fission
during the 1970s one sees that one or more of the existing co-owners re-
ally to form new units. However, in order to establish the new unit they
needed financial support. Since credits mainly came from Benin, where
they were difficult to obtain and most owners already had loans, the best
approach was (as in the start) to invIte new people to participate as owners.
In Fig.2 we see that nine new owners were invited to participate in the
period from 1971 to 1979. Most of them were workers in the existing
company who had perforrned well and who were able to raise additional
funds. With new companies and new canoes, each of the new group of
owners also needed to provide new workers, both to cover labour needs,
but also as potential allies for future fissions. In this period, the fishery was
more differentiated than today, and that allowed the workers to start their
career by personally buying some bottom gill nets which enabled them to
accumulate funds faster than through the pelagic driftnet business. Owners
were also eager to initiate and organise saving societies (tontines) with their
workers. In this way a system of steady upward mobility was established:
young Pop o came as workers, (some) were later invited to participate as co-
owner, and finally established themselves as heads of company. Virtually
all company leaders present in Pointe-NoIre today and who arrived after
1970 started as workers in a company owned by someone else. It is in this
perspective we must understand the increase of the number of males in the
Popo community in the 1970s. Very few came with established companies
from Benin without prior involvement as workers.
Despite the considerable lack of data, the patterns in the emergence of
a new production system allow us to reflect on the question of the
economic growth of the system. Numerous authors who write about the
Popo fisheries as being highly dynamic substantiate theIr views by referring
to data from the 1970s, but they do not critically de fine what type of
dynamism they talk about. Nevertheless, there can be no doubt that the
most striking feature is that the growth in the 1970s was based mainly on
demographie growth in general and that of owners in particular. The total
increase in means of production (which was substantial) must be seen as
largely a reflection of the greater number of people. There were, as
mentioned, approximately as many fishermen for each canoe in 1977 as in
1970. However, this does not tell us very much about economic develop-
ment, since we lack data on the exact number of owners and who owned
what. Some data connected to Fig.2 may nevertheless give us some idea
about the situation. In 1969 there were six owners for the first company
canoe. In 1979, fourteen owners in five companies were operating six
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canoes. That in itself means that the number of owners/canoe had been
more than halved. When we also know that the average number of nets
operated by the Popo canoes increased from between 150-400m in 1973
(Niel 1973) to between 500-700m in 1983 (Gobert 1985a),6 it seems
reasonable to assurne a certain increase of means of production/owner in
the 1970s.
. .. Figure 2
DevelopmentofÒne'company from its creation untiI today
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6 These figures refer to the number of nets operated on a fishing trip. They do not tell us
about the volume of nets owned by the companies, although there normally wil be a
correlation between the two. No data on outboard engines allow comparisons during this
time span.
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The increase in the male population combined with increases in means
of produetion and catches 7 soon led to problems in selling the fish. In the
early 1970s most of the catch was sold to Congolese traders at the beach.
They were not very numerous, each of them only bought limited volurnes
and they were difficult to control in terms of giving them credits. Many
Popo present today recall that they themselves had to go to the market in
town to sell fish at critical moments.8 This fact combined with the growing
consolidation of the community is one of the main reasons behind the
increase in the number of women, which accelerated from around 1973.
Although many of the fishermen from the start had contracted alliances
with Congolese women and live d in loosely established relationships with
them, these women never became important actors in Popo economic life.
It was the Popo women - already married to the fishermen, but who had
remained in Benin - who immediately took up the smoking business and
soon solved the problem. Already in 1981 the number of kilns at the beach
had a smoking capacity far in excess of actual catches (Adrien 1981).
The development of a new produetion system and the considerable
increase of people over a short period of time, represented considerable
challenges. As has already been noted, although the Popo in Benin have
their institutions and ways of organising community lIfe, life and work in
Pointe-Noire required its own institutions and social forrns, different not
only from those at home, but also from what they may had experienced in
other migrating situations. In many ways a new community had to be
created.
The first time we hear about ARB at the beach is in 1967. The initiative
to create an association was external as much as internal. In the town,
Béninois traders mainly of Nago (Y ouruba) origin together with other
Béninois of different ethnic backgroundworking as civil servants in the
Congolese administration had lived and worked in Pointe-Noire for many
years and already establIshed an association at their level. The historical
origins and development of this association are blurred and complicated. It
may at least be traced back to the 1930s, and emerged at that time as an
association of people from present-day Ghana, Togo, Benin and Nigeria.
The fishermen in Pointe-Noire before 1962 were connected to the
7 Catch statistics for the 1970s are virtually non-existent. Nevertheless there can be no
doubt that catehes increased substantially and reached their present level (varying
between 5000 and 8000) tons by the late 1970s or early 1980s. At the start of the
ORSTOM's catch statistics programme in 1981, Pop o catehes are recorded at 4,756 tons
(Anon. 1984).8 A paralleI situation is referred by Dhont (1963) in the pre-1962 community.
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association through an Ewe chief (Dhont 1963). Associations based on
national identities emerged only in the 1960s after the various countries had
gained independence, but this development was gradual and slow. In 1967
the other West African foreigners pushed for the integration and
organisation of the newly arrived fishermen. This led to the election of a
chief, Kassa Sévi, who rapidly elaborated the written regulations9 which
at a certain stage were approved by the Béninois Embassy in KInshasa.
However, it was mainly after the end of 1969, when the Popo population
suddenly doubled, that ARB-B started to develop as a distinet and separate
institution which on the one hand was part of the network of Béninois (and
other West Africans) in Congo, and on the other had its own logical and
consistent place in the old Popo system of extended families.
Both for the traders in town as well as for the Pop o fishermen, the main
concern was to mInimise conflicts with Congolese society. This is clearly
reflected in the ten general articles of the intern al regulations. Since the
risks of conflicts with Congolese to a large extent depended on their ability
to govern internally, ARB-B was given intern al control functions from the
outset. The way it deals with intern al conflicts demonstrates very clearly its
integration in the extended family system. Matters that can be satisfactorily
resolved at family lev el are never brought to ARB-B's attention. Only in
cases when the "lower levels" faIl in finding viable solutions or in cases
involving the whole population, will ARB-B as an institution get involved.
Jf judged necessary, ARB leaders in town may also paricipate, although
this is exceptional.
The selection and recruitment of ARB leaders came about gradually.
There was no formal board in the first years, but as time passed a need for
treasurers, accountants and secretaries emerged and people were appointed.
Equally important were a group of so-called lconsultants' with whom Kassa
Sévi conferred when appointing people to the various positions and
conceming all major decisions. These consultants were no-one else than the
elders of from the different extended families, who also constituted the bulk
of the chiefs of company.
The selection criteria for leaders to ARB-B were from the outset the
same as those in the families: gender, and seniority in the sen se of broad
personal competence. But because of the particularities in the new situation,
a person' s individual capacity to establish and efficiently use the relations
he established in the Congolese society became a crucial element of
"seniority". ARB-B quickly developed efficient and direct links with pivotal
9 These regulations explicitly deal with the fishermen. We are not aware of written
regulations for any other group of foreigners at that time.
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actors in Congolese society, in society as well as in the state apparatus. The
leader of the ViIi fishermen was a close friend of Kassa Sévi and actually
influenced his appointment. Within the Congolese state apparatus the Popo
managed to establish close contacts within all the essential sectors - which
in the 1970s were the Party (PCT), the army and the police in particular.
Also at the municipal level and in customs and port authorities they had
close links with individual persons. In this way ARB-B as an institution
gained a kind of de facto control of all important external relations, also
those connecting the fishermen to the rest of the Béninois and West African
community in the town.
Despite this monopoly, ARB-B was continuously controlled by the
extended family institutions through the system of consultants. ARB-B's
internal authority depended to a certain extent on consensus; but, with a
range of diverging interests among the members and a constant need to
organise things differently from what they were used to, consensus was
difficult to achieve. Nor was it always the best tool with which to govem,
so a certain amount of "repression" was needed. The most obvious and
already well known to ol was the "management of fear" through the active
use of religion. From the beginning, ARB-B became able to use and
manipulate the common ideology of the Pop o in their intern al governing,
but since ARB- B leaders often were younger and not necessarily qualified
in relIgious matters, their use of religion always relied on support from at
least a majority of the extended family leaders. Even today the
"consultants" have an important power basis; they are the ones who
legitimise any changes in commonly accepted norms of behaviour through
translating and reinterpreting Pop o myths and basic values, and they also
"adapt" the meaning of modern technology and forms of organisation into
a suitable Pop o mode of work.
In this way an intricate system of power-sharing developed between the
two main political structures of the community. ARB-B leaders got their
power through their network of external contacts which they used to serve
the community. That power source was counterbalanced through the
ideological control that remained in the hands of the extended family
leaders. This power-sharing and the history of the establIshment of ARB- B
also provide us with some key elements for understanding another aspect
of the demographic development: the increased numerical dominance of the
Xwla and Xweda people at the expense of the Mina and Anlo Ewe.
The Togolese Mina and the Ewe fishermen, who had been the dominant
groups before 1962, were included in the same political framework as the
rest. Although the Mina have a different origin than the Aja and the Ewe,
they have live d in the same area as the others and are integrated in the Aja-
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Ewe way of life. However, they soon found themselves in the minority
compared to the others, and were connected to ARB-B mainly in a formal
way as the latter more and more appeared as an organisation for the
Béninois. It is symptomatic that no Mina or Ewe was appointed to the
board, or functioned as consultants.lO In minority and with lIttle political
influence, the few who had arrived were not able to recruit new ones.11
However, the Xweda were also in clear minority before 1970. The
traditional relationship between them and the Xwla has of ten been more
problematic than that of the Xwla to the Mina or Ewe. Nevertheless, the
Xweda grew in number as much as the Xwla. One obvious reason is that
the X weda were Béninois, and the external ARB leaders wished to prornote
a new national identity instead of the traditional ethnic ones. Perhaps
equally important was that the X weda managed to make effective use of the
particular religious functions and authority which they have had in southern
Benin for centuries. The secrets and the particular relations the Xweda had
to voodoos and common forefathers represented a potential danger, but also
a strong means for governance. And finally, closer examination of the
lineages of the people in Pointe-Noire reveals that many of the fishermen
who de fine themselves as Xwla because their home villages lay in
traditional X wla territories, recognise their "real" origin as X weda. One
example of lineages with such. a type of "double identity"12 was that of
their leader Kassa Sévi. For these reasons the X wla and the X weda very
soon came to dominate the community of the foreigners politically and
thereby also demographically.
From the outset ARB-B was only margin all y involved in the internal
economic affairs of the community. However, with the changes in mode of
recruitment to production units compared to the old systems at home, and
the economic complexity of the new co-ownership structure, serious
conflicts on economic matters were inevitable. Initially, attempts were made
10 Whether they in the beginning functioned as consultants or not is open to discussion,
since this position is informaL. However, today both groups are explicitly kept outside
any significant political positions in the community. It is therefore symptomatic that the
two Mina households stil living at the beach have chosen very different strategies, both
in their mode of work and in their relations to the Congolese society, than the rest of the
population.
11 Moreover, the company system of the Mina and the Ewe differed from that of the Xwla.
They did not create the same type of upward mobility system as that described above.
12 Double identity is descriptive in the sense that one observes that people of these lineages
of ten make alternate use of Xwla or Xweda identity according to context. However,
among the rest of the population, this group is often considered as "neither nor". The
Xwla consider them as Xweda and vice versa.
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to solve these conflicts within the framework of the extended family
system, but the system quickly demonstrated its inability to prornote
satisfactory solutions. It was ARB-B who developed new sets of regulations
for solving these conflicts, often based on far more particularistic principles
than those of the families who had to take account not only of the interests
of the persons present in Pointe-Noire, but also of histories and interests
connected to people at home. ARB-B therefore became a dominantjudicial
institution in the 1970s, known to base its verdicts on "facts" instead of on
the of ten unclear and min gled interests which so often guide the politics of
the extended families. On the other hand, careful examination of a limited
number of trials demonstrates that to consider ARB-B regulations as
basically particularistic would be a misleading simplification. It is important
to note though, that ARB- B never came in a position where it had any
influence or controlover one of the most important economic transactions
- the credits given to the fishermen in Pointe-Noire by people in Benin.13
To the extent that such control existed, it remained in the hands of the
extended families involved.
The political development of the Popo community from the creation of
ARB-B in 1967 and during the 1970s clearly demonstrates two separate
things. First that ARB-B, the way it developed, must be understood mainly
as an expression of corporate polItical action between the Xwla and the
Xweda present in Pointe-Noire. It is not a question of certain groups or
individuals of Popo seeking to take control at the expense of others. The
system of power-sharing between ARB-B and the extended families
guaranteed equal possibilities, independent of background, to practice what
in the early 70s became identified as Popo fishery. It was very difficult for
specific individuals or groups to utilIse the political institutions in order to
achieve economic benefits at the expense of others. The economic interests
of Popo workers were naturally of minor concern in this system, although
both the families as well as ARB-B could be mobilised in cases where
patrons abused their power. However, the economic system implied that
many workers very soon became co-owners and later chiefs of companies,
provided they perforrned according to collective expectations and could
raise the required sums of money. Although it was external forces which
pushed for a certain type of political organisation at the beach, the system
as it developed became distinctively different from the rest of ARB. For the
major part it must be understood as something created internally among the
fishermen themselves as an answer to their specific needs.
13 We know that certain leaders like Kassa tried to create such a control, but except for
some specific cases connected to his home vilage, he never managed to enforce it.
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Secondly, the development gives clear indications of what was the
corporate basis of the pOlItical organisation and of ARB-B in particular. As
already mentioned, one of its most striking characteristics has been its
serious preoccupation and its continuous efforts to minimise all sources of
conflicts with Congolese society in general and with the government in
particular. The overall concern of the Popo in Pointe-Noire was to be able
to remain and to work in the new surroundings and to secure these rights.
Such a preoccupation is only natural in view of their general experience
from migration as well as the fact that the events of November 1962 were
well-known to all. Residenee and working rights could only be achieved
through the consent of the Congolese authorities14 and indirectly through
the acceptance of the local Vili fishermen in Pointe-Noire, recognised to
have traditional rights to the coastal area including the sea.15 The latter
point was initially quite important, as reflected in the close relationship
established in the first years between Kassa Sévi and the Vili chief of
vill age at the beach. In this perspective the strategy of minimising all kind
of conflicts with the host population and their representatives, as well as
open conflicts among Popo themselves, become perfectly logical: it was a
question of ensuring one's rights to stay and work outside the territory
where such rights are ascribed by birth.
Given the general demographic and political conditions in West and
Central Africa where the mobility and dynamics of the various population
groups are particularly high and ever changing, and where regulations and
control of frontiers are weak, the question of residenee permits for the Popo
(independent of how this group is defined internally) becomes a collective
issue. Even if individual residence permits are in principle issued by the
authorities, and formal arrangements exist for a person legally to import the
required means of production, these very often remain "in principle"
options. The question of collectiveness is neither simple nor clear-cut.
When the Béninois traders urged that the Pop o be included in ARB, the
only reasonable interpretation of this is the recognition among the traders
that the performance of the fishermen, at least indirectly, could have
consequences for their own opportunities to stay and work in the country.
The question of collective access may therefore also include people of
different occupations and different origins.
14 This does not only mean accepting their presence. It also implies accepting the import
of gear such as canoes and to some extent also engines and nets which of ten were
difficult to obtain in Congo in the early 1970s.
15 For the customary marine tenure system among the ViIi, see Nguinguiri 1988.
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To illustrate the complexity attached to the question of collective versus
individual residenee permits, as well as the difficulties of establishing
corporate political action, let us have a look at the perhaps most dramatic
event in the history of the Popo in Pointe-Noire.
After the death of President Marien Ngouabi in May 1977 and the
political changes which ensued, the Congolese government decided in
early September the same year, and without any advanee notification, to
repatriate all foreigners who did not possess formal residenee permits. In
one week, after 20-hour detention of the whole Pop o community,
approximately 4/5 of them were sent home via Brazzavile. Immediately
after, the authorities confiscated all 166 outboard engines belonging to
Popo, with the justification that proper import permits were lacking. Most
of the ARB leadership possessed legal residenee permits and thus
remained in Pointe-Noire. In this situation, they decided that all remaining
Pop o should refrain from fishing other than for pure subsistence. The
decision quickly led to a severe shortage of fish in the markets in town
and this situation prevailed for three months. Finally, the leaders of the
remaining Pop o were convoked to ameeting with "l'Etat major" in
Pointe-Noire where they were asked why they did not fish. Answering
that their engines had been taken from them, they were asked to come
back the next day with whatever they could find of documents regarding
the engines. ARB-B then collected most of the invoices and through
negotiations they managed to regain possession of 150 of the 166 engines.
There upon, normal commercial fishing was resumed.
Three to four months after the repatriation, and having heard about the
recent developments in Congo, four Pop o who at the time of the
repatriation happened to be in Benin for personal reasons, decided to
return to Pointe-Noire. Upon arrival they were immediately detained at the
police station at the airport, and the Pop o fishermen responded
immediately by returning to subsistence fishing. No new meetings were
held, but after a week the four were released and the Popo returned to
fishing as normal. Slowly the rest of the Popo population returned. By
1982 the population had reached its former level. For the gre at majority
it was the same people who returned.
This episode gives rise to at least two questions. First, how is it possible to
talk of collective rights when the case clearly demonstrates that it was
primarilya question of personal residenee permits? Second, if ARB-B is to
be understood as a political institution established to collectively secure the
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rights of residenee and work, why did it not require its members to have
their legal permits and import documents in order?16
Residence and work permits can of course not be seen in isolation from
what one has to pay for them. Jf the costs exceed the potential profit, the
permit is of lIttle use. Like anyone else the fishermen will try to reduce the
costs to a minimum. On the other hand, we know that at the level of the
host government, individuals or groups of representatives will try to get the
fishermen to pay as much as possible. Investigations among Pop o with
formal residence permits in 1991 led us to conclude that the only answer
to the question of cost was "it depends". Even at the level of the Congolese
authorities it was difficult to get exact information about which types of
documentation were required and how much it would cost. Returning to the
situation in 1977 it is symptomatic that ARB- B leaders were among the 1/5
who had legal permits. Through their contacts within and their knowledge
of the Congolese state apparatus they were able to get the permts at a
"reasonable" price. This does not mean, however, that their contacts were
willing or able to provide permts for the whole population on similar
conditions. For the great majority individual access is more of an illusion
than a real option, and they have to seek other solutions.
The confiscation of the outboard engines demonstrates the collective
aspect even more clearly, since all the engines were confiscated. It is
probably not possible to fin d out whether the Congolese authorities were
formally right or not in demanding import permits - but from our perspec-
tive, this is not the main point either. In a floating situation where no one
really knows what is required, this ignorance may be us ed more or less
systematically according to the purposes of different actors "representing"
the government. It is always possible to find something which is not in
conformity with certain rules or regulations. The fishermen can in fact
never rely on ensuring their stay or their access to crucial means of
production exc1usively through heeding more or less formal demands.
Jf it had been possible for each individual fisherman (or each company)
to secure his own residence and work rights by formal means, there would
simply not have been a need for ARB-B in the form it developed. The
whole rationale behind it was to secure, as best as it could, these rights for
its members on a collective basis. It was through the creativity and
flexibility combined with toughness of the ARB-B leaders that these rights
16 Both questions are essential in relation to West African migrant fisheries in general.
Most of the repatriation proeesses known in relation to fishermen have taken place on
the basis of residenee permits. Furthermore, it is reported from all over the region that
lack of legal permits is the rule more than the exception.
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were secured in 1977. Even in a critical situation like the one we have just
examined, and despite the inconveniences and materiallosses this episode
imposed on the majority of the Popo, the end result was that the rights
were retained for the Popo already established there. 17 As noted, they all
slowly returned and to ok up their previous activities. Unlike the case in
1962, the political organisation of the Pop o had proved itself efficient. In
terms of understanding the level of legitimacy that ARB has managed to
acquire among its members, its handling of the repatriation episode remains
a crucial element of explanation.
However, the underlying reasons for the Popo presenee in Pointe-Noire
were as we argued earlier, linked to their particular relations to the home
area, including the territory, the forefathers, the family system and its
members as well as other individuals and institutions in the Popo
community. In relation to that context, ARB-B could not be of much
significance. Regulation of Pointe-Noire affairs was something completely
different; it in volve d other people than regulation of more fundamental
questions connected to the basic identity of people and questions like
marriage relations, child raising, deaths as well as management of lineage
territories. Only the system of extended families could guarantee proper
management of these questions and safeguard the reproduction of relations
to the home communities. The Pop o political organisation as it emerged
during the 1960s and 70s must therefore be seen, on the one hand, as a
reflection of their ne ed for corporate political action to secure residence and
work rights abroad, and on the other as a continuation of the old Popo
system based on relatively close contact between the migrants and their
home territories.
ARB-B, although corporated around the rights of residence and work,
also proved to be more efficient and useful for many other purposes related
to the reproduction of a new production system. Gradually it came to play
the most dominant role in everyday lIfe. However, its own legitimacy
continued to dep end heavily on the system of extended families which not
only reproduced but probably also reinforced the value and the use of the
traditional symbols and representations, such as a particular way of Pop o
dressing, specific foods, the use of Popo language and not the least
religious ceremonies and rituals. This particular combination of new and
old, coupled with the undisputable personal capacities of Kassa Sévi as
17 In a case which dates 16 years back, we have been careful to present only the part of
the story which has been possible to cross-check. Other backstage elements underline the
essenee of the argument even further.
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leader, led by the late 1970s to a political system characterised by a high
degree of internal governance.
However, with respect to the reproduction of the newly established
produetion system, the political organisation also created certain major
probIerns. As a consequence of the particular division of functions between
ARB- B and the families just outline d, the credit relations of the owners in
Pointe-Noire had to be controlled by the families and not the ARB - but
the ability of this institution to ensure that people fulfilled their
responsibilities was weak. As aresult, this particular source of funding
slowly dried up. In the problem of organising the control of credits during
the 1970s lies a source for further change in the political organisation
during the 1980s which on the one hand increased the capacity of intern al
governance, while also creating new and serious probIerns.
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5. Changes in growth patterns and
political challenges in the 1980s
The best way to illustrate that important changes occurred in the dynamics
of the Pop o community around 1980, is to point to an apparent paradox in
the demographic development which no-one yet has investigated and which
is reflected in Table l. Although the system of company fissions, which in
the 1970s probably represented the basic explanatory factor behind
demographie growth, has continued through the 1980s, the growth in male
population and in canoes shows virtually full stop after the return of those
who had been repatriated in 1977. In 1983 the Popo male population is
reported to have been 483 (Makaya 1983) operating from about 110 canoes
(Gobert 1985a), and these are basically the same figures found today.1 By
contrast, the number of adult women has continued to grow, almost
doubling in the ten years from 243 in 1981 to 420 in September 1991.2
No reliable population figures exist for the period between 1983 and 1991. However,
takng ORSTOM' s yearly canoe surveys into account, and assuming that the ratio of
Popo/canoe has been more or less stable, one may assume that the population increased
slightly towards 1988 to decrease again towards 1991. The canoe surveys show that from
130 canoes in 1983, the number increased towards 149 in 1988 and later fell to 134 in
1991 (Anon. Undated)
A population figure of 1000 Popo fishermen in Pointe-Noire in 1985 which occurs
in certain reports and articles (e.g. Nguinguiri 1991) and which is said to derive from
the registration made by the "marine marehande" must be considered incorrect. ARB-B' s
own population register indicates that the number of fishermen never can have exceeded
550.
The differenee between the ORSTOM canoe survey figures and those used in Table
L stems from different methods of counting. The ORSTOM surveys include all canoes
which have been used the last 12 months as well as a small number of Ghanaian canoes
owned by Congolese (between 3 and 5). The figures used in the table reflect canoes in
regular use by the Popo. The differenee in 1983 is 130 versus 110 and in 1991 134
versus 120.
2 All population figures from 1991 are based on thorough elaborations of ARB' s own
population registers, which proved of very high quality. They include only people
actually present in Congo on the 11/9-93. The total number of Popo residing in Pointe-
Noire must therefore be considered somewhat higher, since a certain number of them
wil, at any given time, be in Benin.
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Table L
Demographic development among the Popo 1970-1991
Year # men # women # # canoes sources
companies
24 ? 24
117
1991 467 424 107 120
-Samba 1970
-N guinguiri
1991
-Cayré &
Fontana 1977
-Chaboud 1982
-Adrien 1981
-Gobert 1985a
-Own survey
1970 100-20? 5
1976-7 470 200-300
?
1982-3 483-500 243 75 100-110
Figures followed by"?" are based on estimates.
Superficial arguments have explained this change partly by saying that
the beach villages now are overpopulated, and partly by that ARB-B has
managed to gain full control and prevents new establishments. However,
such arguments cannot be considered satisfactory. Overpopulation in this
context is a relative concept, second, we have seen that the way ARB-B
functioned in the 1970s did not allow this institution to pre vent its members
in their strive for upward mobility without seriously losing credibility and
legitimacy. Jf our interpretation of the development in the Popo community
in the 1970s is correct, then there must have been other changes in the
community which altere d the conditions behind the dynamics of the
demographic growth.
The best way to address this question is to investigate in some depth the
changes and the development in the companies. On the basis of data
collected by Gobert in November 1983 (1985a) and my own data from
November 1992, Table 2 gives a detailed picture of how this 9-year
development has taken place within 21 units. Table 3 summarises the
quantitative data which can be read from this development.
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Table 3
Development in means of produetion in 21 companies
comps. owners own.! G.can. can.! engines eng/ '200'+ nets/
comp own. own. '400' own.
1983 21 65 3.09 28 0.43 66 1.01 321 4.94
1992 28 52 1.86 27 0.52 56 1.07 655 12.60
G.can.: Ghanaian canoes
engines: Outboard engines generally 25 or 40 hp.
, 200' +' 400': U nits of pelagic driftnets of 200 and 400 meshes depth. Since a ' 400' net is
nothing but a double '200' net, we have for 1992 added the number of '200's to the
number of '400' multiplied by 2 (200+(400x2)).
Tables 2 and 3 support the impression from Table L that the fissions of
companies continued. The 21 companies surveyed by Gobert in 1983 had
become 28 in 1992, even though three of the original ones had been
dissolved (Table 2). However, the Tables also show that the number of
owners decreased from 65 to 52 and the owner/company ratio fell from
3.09 in 83 to 1.86 in 92. Closer examination shows that 5 are dead and not
substituted, 6 have failed as owners and become workers and 2 have retired
and returned to Benin. Not a single new owner has been recruited to the 21
units during the 9 years in question.
The same phenomenon may also be illustrated in other ways. From Fig.2,
we see that in the period from 1969 to 79, L company had increased to 5
and the number of owners had grown from 6 to 14. After 1979 the same
5 companies have developed into 9 units, but the number of owners
decreased from 14 to 13 due to the death of one (owner 7). Furthermore,
a survey of all 41 production units located in the more northerly beach
vill age shows that only 3 of the 71 owners present in 1992 had become
owners by 1980 or after. The remaining 68 had achieved their status as
owner before 1980. In the same survey, the 20 units created in 1979 or
earlier had an average of 3.09 owners per unit, while the same ratio for the
21 units created in 1980 or later had fallen to 1.19. There can hence be
lIttle doubt that while the number of owners in the 1970s grew steadily
through the mechanism of upward mobility, this process must have stopped
sometime before 1983.
In order to understand this demographie stabiIisation we need to look into
the reasons behind the stop in ownership recruitment. The financing of new
companies in the 1970s was secured mainly through the relations the
fishermen had to their home communities in Benin. In terms of credits this
source was difficult to utilise, for many reasons. The availabilIty of money
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in home areas was limited. Those co-owners in Pointe-Noire wishing to
become heads of company had already made use of such credits and could
hardly expect to get more, particularly since it seems that the terms of
repayment were not much respected. Conflicts concerning repayment had
to be treated through the extended family system, which was ill-suited for
dealing with credits of the size required by the migrants ' new produetion
system, and over such geographical distances. It is difficult to get a clear
picture of the totality of these credits, but of the few cases we could
investigate (including the two reflected in Fig. l), it is symptomatic that they
all date from the 1970s and that at most only scant repayment has taken
place. There is little doubt that the home communities slowly dried up as
a source for funding new companies in the late 1970s.
At the same time a new source of funding emerged through the rapidly
increasing economic role of Popo women in Pointe-Noire. Many of them
quickly made good profits in their proeessing and trade. On the basis of
Adrien's data (1981 pp.30-1) it is relatively simple to demonstrate that
women processors and traders must have had at their disposal fairly
substantial sums of money already at the beginning of the decade.3
In the late 1970s and into the early 1980s, the common pattern for
women was personally to sell in retail the fish they had bought and smoked
at the various markets in Pointe-Noire (Le Gall and Petit jean 1975, Cayré
and Fontana 1977, Adrien 1981, Chaboud 1982, Makaya 1983). This
approach limited the volurnes of fish each woman could handle in terms of
time. Adrien seems to estimate that 100 kilos of fresh fish was what a
woman normally could manage to handle on a daily basis. However, slowly
during the 1980s, the wholesale system as described in the first section of
this study became the dominant mode of operation. That system is based
on sale not only in Pointe-Noire, but in the whole CFCO railway area from
the ocean to Brazzaville. The sale of marine fish products in these areas
was not new, since various enterprises handling fish from the industrial
fleet and with support of the Congolese government had for several years
been involved in selling of frozen pelagic fish in towns and villages like
3 A proper economic analysis is not possible within the framework of this paper, nor is
it the intention. However, Adrien's data reveal that a Pop o woman in 1981 had a profit
of about FCF A 5000 for smoking and selling L 00 kg of fresh fish. Jf we assume that
about 70 per cent of the Popo catehes in 1981 were treated by the Pop o women, this
means that a total profit of FCFA 175 millions would have been generated among them,
representing an average yearly profit of FCF A 720,000 for each woman. These figures
are exclusively meant as an ilustration and should not be used for further analytical
purposes.
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Loubomo, Makabana, Mouanda-M'Binda, Dolisie, Jacob and N'Kayi and
Brazzaville (Le Gall and Petit jean 1975, Cayré and Fontana 1977).
The wholesale system in the artisan sector involves considerable risks.
The fish is regularly sent by train to the clients of the Popo women, who
are then expected to come to Pointe-Noire to pay their debts after an agreed
period of time. Few indeed are the Popo processors who have not lost
considerable sums due to payment probIerns. However, this wholesale
system has also liberated Pop o women, giving them more time to concen-
trate on the smoking, hence making it possible to handle much bigger
volumes. A woman together with her hired Congolese labour can easily
smoke between L and 1.5 tons of fish per day, as long as she does not have
to sell it on the market herself. That volurnes of this order are only very
rarely treated by one woman, is probably because a woman does not have
access to that much fish.4
The development in Pointe-Noire is hence similar to what is reported to
have occurred in many other places along the West African coast: women
traders, in order to get increased access to fish, have started to invest
heavily in fisheries. Through providing credits to new companies, some
women have managed to increase their provisions of raw materials
considerably. In Pointe-Noire there have be en various ways of facing this
general strategy. For instance, a woman can support her own husband or
another relative who wants to establish a new personal company, or she can
provide credits to already existing companies. Jf she funds her husband, it
is to increase her share of the catch (already ascribed by mariage); in the
other cases it is simply the right to buy fish which is her major concern.
This is clearly demonstrated by the fact that credits from women to
company owners, unlike the practice in other credit relations, do not include
dates of repayment, or interest. It is only if and when a woman decides to
renounce on her right to buy fish that the question of repayment becomes
relevant.
In all cases of credit assessment, and independent of the credit strategies
just mentioned, one of the main concems of a woman creditor is the
number of other women with whom she will have to share the fish. No
woman can under any circumstances claim more fish in a company than
what the wife (or wives) of the chief of company receives, without that
creating serious conflicts and general moral condemnation. The size of the
shares to the wives of the chief, depends furthermore upon the total number
of wives married into the company. The lower the number of women, the
4 This situation concerns only the most successful among the women. There are of course
many who are mainly constrained in their work by lack of money.
46
more fish the creditor can expect to receive. The fewer the wives in any
(new or old) company, the more desirable it is for an outside woman to get
access. And since the number of wives is also related to the number of men
(owners in particular), a potential creditor will tend to invest in units with
few owners when assessing the creditworthiness of a company (of course
in combination with questions related to its general economic performance).
The same logic applies in the case of supporting the creation of a new unit.
Jf the new chief, as in the 1970s, seeks to ally with workers in order to get
the funds needed, the number of wives will automatically increase. Jf a
woman creditor provides the money, the chief can establish himself
individually (or at least reduce the number of co-owners) and she is thereby
automatically increasing her own share.5 In Table 2 we can see that in
1983 individually owned units represented 8 out of 21; by 1992, 18
companies out of the 28 existing then had become "one man units".6
The switch from loans provided by people in the home communities
towards loans given by Popo women living in Pointe-Noire must have
taken place gradually , but after 1980 no cases are known of new companies
established with credits from Benin. From a situation in the 1970s charac-
terised by the continuous creation of new production units and inclusion of
new owners through a system of upwardmobility, new units continued to
be created in the 1980s, but now without the inclusion of new owners. An
obvious consequence of this change has been a cernenting or rigidification
of the socio-economic statuses of the fishermen. In the 1980s Popo workers
in Pointe-Noire remained workers with few possibilities of overcoming the
important social barier of owner/worker. In the northern beach vill age only
one case exists where a group of three workers (father and two sons) have
been able to establish themselves as co-owners after 1979.7
The alterations in the financing patterns and the subsequent changes in
the dynamics of recruitment in the companies do not in themselves explain
the halt in growth of the Popo male population in Pointe-Noire. Although
the increase of owners stopped, the economic growth within each unit could
in principle continue, which again must have had an influence on the
5 In the case of funding her husband, it is a bit more complicated because a wife also has
to take the role of any co-wives into consideration. The "best" solution is always
considered to be for each co-wife to invest an equal sum in their husband's company.
6 In the same article Gobert reports that 37 out of 41 fishing units were collectively owned
(1985b, p. 254). In 1992, the survey of the northern vilage reveals that out of the 41
companies, those collectively owned only counted 19.
7 Some other attempts have been made either in allance or separate from already existing
co-owners. Except for the one referred to, these attempts have all systematically failed.
47
recruitment of Popo workers. Table 3 shows that there has been a
considerable growth in means of production since 1983, both overall as
well as in terms of gear/owner. However, this growth has mainly involved
the volurne of nets; the total number of canoes (and thereby also engines)8
has remained stable, and the canoe/owner ratio shows only a slight increase.
The strategy of the owners in order to increase their catches seems hence
to have been to increase the number of nets without increasing the number
of canoes accordingly. This can be done with bigger canoes, which permit
the use of more nets per fishing trip. Data exist which demonstrate that this
has indeed happened. The average length of Ghanaian canoes in Pointe-
Noire has been in constant growth from 9.3m in 1973 (Niel 1973) to
L 1.35m in 1981 (Guederat 1981 quoted from Gobert 1985a) and 12.25m in
1992 according to my own canoe survey. The length of drift nets in
operation also increased substantially; it was 500-700m in 1983 (Gobert
1985a), and in 1992 the average figure probably lies somewhere between
900 and 1200m.9
Although this is difficult to substantiate, the growth in nets seems
exclusively to have concerned the pelagic driftnets. As a consequence, Popo
fishery today appears more specialised in capture of pelagic speeies than
ever. One immediate reason is the introduction of a new driftnet of double
depth (generally referred to as the "400 meshes") which was developed by
some of the Popo themselves in 1989-90 and which has prolonged the
pelagic fishing seasons by several months.lO The present use of bottom gill
nets is now limited either to fishing for ceremonial purposes, or when the
pelagic stocks are considered absolutely out of reach. Even in these cases,
only a few chiefs of company allow their canoes to be used for demersal
fishing.
8 The decrease in the number of engines cannot be considered significant since there are
great uncertainties as to when to stop including an outboard engine. In the 1992 survey,
all engines which were not considered "savable" were excluded.
9 No systematic data collection was performed, but continuous daily interviews and
observations for 8 months support this estimate.
10 In general terms there are two fishing seasons for pelagic speeies ; the main one starts
in March or April and lasts until September; there is also a shorter one lasting
approximately one month in December and January (Gobert 1991). The introduction of
the "400 meshes" prolonged the season substantially in 1991 and early 1992. However,
due to the variability of the resources, the timing and the duration of the fishing seasons
as well as the selection of technologies vary considerably from one year to another. In
autumn 1992 the potential use of "400 meshes" was reduced substantially compared to
the year before.
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To what extent these strategies - on the one hand the specialIsation into
pelagic fishery, and on the other, an almost exclusive concentration on
increase of nets - can be judged to be economically most profitable, is
highly uncertain. Regarding pelagic specialisation, both price trends for the
past ten years as well as arecent economic analysis (Tutuanga 1991)
indicates that, from the point of view of the fishermen, the development in
pelagic fisheries has been less interesting. However, when we consider the
economic position of the Popo proeessors as it has been described, this
specialisation becomes easier to understand. For the proeessor, the main
profit potential is arguably connected to smoking of pelagic fish and
reflected in credit strategies. According to all owners, loans from Popo
women are easiest to obtain for gear belIeved to increase the availability of
pelagic fish. Popo women do normally not fund bottom gill nets. Despite
the very high costs involved in introducing the "400 meshes" driftnets, by
1991 as many as 30 per cent of the companies in the northern beach village
had acquired a sufficient number of these nets.ll And this was only one
year after two companies used them successfully for the first time. Most of
these sudden extra investments were financed by the Popo women. As one
fishermen put it: "Suddenly the women were queuing to finance our new
, 400 meshes' since they had seen the year before that the nets could extend
the sardinella season by several months."
This concentration of growth in nets at the expense of other means of
production is a more complicated question. On paper, it would probably be
in the economic interests of both owners and women creditors to invest in
a more balanced way and increase the number of canoes as well. Here we
have to take into account the level of administration and risks involved in
operating several canoes. Jf the trend seems to be towards individually
owned units, an owner (usually a man without any formal education) who
wishes to invest in an additional canoe will have to face a range of
challenges: a substantial increase of the involvement of his network of
confidants in Benin and thereby also a considerable increase in his risks;
a doubling in the number of Pop o clients whom he will also have to
finance in order to get them to Pointe-Noire; and finally a substantial
increase in the time he has to spend in general administration of the unit,
at the expense of other tasks. It is symptomatic that the few individual
owners who operate more than one canoe, and who are all considered
particularly competent in administrative matters, are unanimous in saying
11 At lea st 5-6 units are needed. This represents an approximate cost surpassing FCFA L
milion. From Table 2 we see that more than half of the companies (15 out of 28) had
enough "400 meshes" as of November 1992.
49
that for them, two canoes is the absolute limit to what they can manage to
control. One canoe seems to constitute a sort of "marginal utility" for
individualowners.
In a situation with such dramatic changes - first in relations between
men and women, and second in those between owners and workers com-
pared to the previous decade - we must assurne that the political situation
has also altered. In the 1970s the community had certainly not been
homogenous in social and economic respects, whereas in the 1980s differ-
entiation became more visible and pronounced, partly as a result of the
increased economic role of women and partly due to the stop in upward
social mobility among men. Women never had a place in the political Insti-
tutions of the Popo; and, as noted, ownership among men largely followed
lines of seniority in Pointe-Noire, usually coherent with the general con-
ception of seniority underlying the extended family system. This meant that
both women and workers were seriously constrained in their direct political
participation, whether conceming extended families or ARB-B. In order to
avoid conflicts which easily could lead to severe problems for the whole
community, the new situation had to be addressed in one way or another.
We can discern considerable differences in how the interests of the two
groups have been dealt with in Popo politics, and in the consequences.
With a gender-differentiated economy, Popo women have in principle long
enjoyed same economic rights as men. When it became natural and
necessary to regulate and control the new credit relations, women' sinterests
as creditors were taken care of in basically the same manner and according
to the same rules as the relations between co-owners had been handled
since the early 1970s. And since the women were members of Pointe-Noire
community, their economic affairs were generally integrated under ARB- B
jurisdiction and control. This was unproblematic and no doubt facilitated
access of loans for some, as well as liberating the produetion system from
dependenee on people in the home area who only indirectly were integrated
in the political system of the migrants. It also increased the dominance of
ARB- B as the main political body. The only economic affairs not integrated
in ARB-B regulations seem to be those between spouses. Economic
relations within marriage become too delicate for ARB- B to determine on
the basis of "particularistic" economic regulations which easily may conflict
with the overall ideology of husband dominance in the household. House-
hold matters always remain within the household, unless the case is so
serious that the lineages (including that of the woman) have to become
involved.
With their growing economic power, women could easily become a
challenge and constitute a threat to the established order of the owners. For
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example, one could imagine that women creditors, in order to increase their
provision of fish, started offering loans to workers who wished to create
their own companies. Or, as their Ghanaian and Togolese sisters have done,
they could start to invest directly in fisheries by establishing their own
private companies (Overaa, forthcoming). Except for some few cases where
workers have received assistance from women, and, as already mentioned,
one company created in 1990 and owned by a woman, ,this does not seem
to have taken place.12 A more detailed investigation of these questions
may help us understand how the game of gender politics is played and why
these strategies do not seem to be chosen by wealthy women.
Popo workers are extremely valuable to their patrons. In most cases the
latter will have brought them, forwarding their travel and resettlement
expenses. The owners very much depend on their Popo labour in work.
Substituting them with young Congolese cannot be considered an
alternative because the owners lack similar means of controlover them.
Therefore, the Congolese work force continuously goes in and out of the
various companies, and if a worker has a conflict with one owner, that
automatically leads to the withdrawal of the worker to the benefit of
another. Also, if the catches have been good, the Congolese worker will
often choose to withdraw temporarily until he needs money once more. For
these reasons, Congolese labour has always been considered unreliable by
the Popo. And likewise, any attempt by Popo workers to liberate will be
strongly opposed by their patrons, and ARB-B effectively regulates and
controls the transfer of the Popo work force from one company to another.
Any woman planning to fund such a liberation must take several factors
into consideration. It is always the owners who remain in control of her
access to fish. Provoking an owner may easily affect her deliveries, even
if they derive from other companies. As head of household her husband
(here we should recall that husbands are owners in 70 per cent of the cases)
retain control of her stay in Congo. To provoke him or one of his
colleagues may result in being mo ved back to his family in Benin. To
profit from ARB-B jurisdietion and protection, any economic trans action
must be carried out in front of witnesses approved by ARB-B. Funding
workers in secrecy is too risky; doing it in "transparency" quickly leads to
sanctions from the owners the woman depends on. A woman who wishes
to support other fishermen (whether they are owners or workers) can only
do so with a sort of publicity which implies the knowledge and consent of
12 Another female-owned company (no. 24 in Table 2) had existed earlier. It was dissolved
on the death of the owner in 1988. However, that was a Mina unit where the woman had
inherited from her husband and had continued his work.
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her husband. He in turn is unlikely to agree on support to any Popo worker,
as that would lead to severe conflicts between him and the owners
concemed, and ARB- B would deem him responsible for the problem. As
long as the owners have common interests in preventing Pop o workers from
establishing themselves, the owners can use their political control to limit
the undesirable consequences of the economic power and influence of their
wives.
More or less the same constraints apply for a woman who wishes to
establish her own company. The husband in particular will resist such an
investment, unless he himself is given command and management, which
in that case means that her investment simply becomes like any other
credit. It is worth noting that the only woman owner now operating is
divorced; she herself has said she has to remain not married to a fisherman
as long as she wants to continue operating as an owner. On the other hand,
divorce generally means that the woman loses control of her children, and
is not seen an alternative economic strategy.
To a certain extent, the economic interests of women as they have
developed during the 1980s can be said to have been integrated into the
Popo political system. Through the inclusion of their credit transactions
under ARB-B jurisdiction, women creditors have been given the protection
necessary to ensure the reproduction of these relations. Furthermore, the
system puts upon the women' s economic dispositions clear limitations
which diminish potential tensions between them and the owners,
particularly if the women gain too much economic power.13 It is the ARB-
B system which provides women with the required material protection.
Marriage relations and thereby the extended family system restrict their
economic options, but as the marriage institution includes so many other
functions and considerations, a woman will rarely opt to avoid marriage so
as to pursue economic goals. Thus, ARB-B's more particularistic principles
in economic affairs do not represent a threat to the owners. When the
female company owner in 1990 sued the person she had selected to manage
her company because he had started to act as if he was the owner and
refused to present accounts to her, the case was judged and the woman
awarded full support according to the general rules regulating relations
between owner and manager.14 However, the underlying precondition for
13 This has led to a situation where close economic collaboration between wives and their
husbands seem to emerge as a viable strategy for both parties, particularly within the
wealthiest households.
14 Some cases of managers operating male-owned companies exist, and managers have also
to be appointed when e.g. the owner travels to Benin.
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this verdict was that the case never could have been brought in front of
ARB-B if she had been maried, and her husband was the manager.
During the 1980s, economic relations back to the home community were
considerably weakened due to changes in financing patterns. In such a
situation, one might have expected that the extended family system would
slowly loosen its grip on politics in Pointe-Noire. One main reason why
this does not seem to have been the case is probably the role the family has
come to play in con trolling the challenges emerging from the greater
economic role of women. In addition, the extended families are still
important in the recruitment of Popo workers, and children are still sent
home to the extended families for schooling and socialisation. The changes
in the economy caused by the arrival of women have to some extent
strengthened the principles of the extended family system in its dealings
with ARB-B. We may say that new gen der relations have favoured the re-
produetion of the extended family system; this, in its turn, has required
continued and perhaps even enforced insistence on Popo ideology and tradi-
tional Pop o values. However, this insistence also reproduces the value of
returning home, as well as the general Pop o norms and expectations con-
cerning the role of migration and migrants, as was described in Chapter 3.
In the face of qualitatively altered conditions, this continued insistence
on Popo symbols and values has created serious problems for Popo
workers. Not only have they had to encounter new types of constraints
which seriously delimit their possibilities for financial success. The
insistence on ideology also produces a rhetoric which emphasises that the
reason for every Popo being abroad, is to earn money to bring back home,
to pay respect to and augment prestige of oneself, the line age and the
village. In a production system which developed as it did in the 1980s, and
which excludes around 60 per cent of the adult male population from doing
exactly what the rhetoric preaches, the situation is bound to become
problematic. And indeed very soon this paradox created problems of
increased tensions, problems which have not yet found a solution.
Workers' representations ofthis conflict are closely linked with the death
of Kassa Sévi in May 1987. According to them, that is when the problems
began and the owners started to become "greedy", not giving consideration
to the needs of their younger brethren. For them Kassa has become the
symbol of the egalitarian aspect of Popo values. The community leadership
and the owners, seeking to reproduce the basis for their dominance, also
make systematic use of Kassa' s memoryas a symboL. But now it is taken
to represent order, collaboration and prosperity - in other words qualIties
connected to ARB-B. In this manner Kassa has become an extraordinarily
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potent but ambiguous symbol, applied to two directly opposed groups of
interests.
The conflict between workers and owners has become largely one of
ideology, where the workers challenge the rhetorics of the owners. In such
a situation, where the workers assert that they represent the true essenee of
Popo values, "management of fear" loses its strength. Thus it seems that the
Popo political system as it developed in the 1970s, has lost parts of its
power-base in relation to the Popo workers. Nevertheless, ARB-B's overall
authority appears to be as strong as ever. W orkers may fight their owners
and grumble about corrption and selfishness among their leaders, but few
seem to challenge ARB-Bas an institution. Jf management of fear has
become less effective, we must therefore assurne that new sources of power
have also emerged in recent years.
In this respect, particular significance seems to attach to ARB-B's
relations with the rest of ARB and with the government, or more correctly
two governments - since both that of the host country as well as the
government of their country of origin obviously play a role in Popo
politics. When ARB-B was established in 1967, the Benin Embassy in
Kinshasa was contacted, and it gave its approval to the written internal
regulations. It has also been reported that the Embassy later circulated the
regulations as a kind of model to other Popo fishing communities abroad
(particularly in Gabon and Cameroon). However, the overall impression is
that the Bénin government during the 1970s played only a limited role in
Popo politics. One should notice that no reference has been made to any
direct participation or contribution in the repatriation episode in 1977, nor
in the months which followed. However, ARB in town was important,
particularly as a guide to how to establish contacts with the Congolese
authorities and with whom.15 We have seen how, as the Popo - Congolese
contacts developed in the 1970s, contact with various p arts of the
administration became an important power-base for ARB-B in its
demarcation vis-à-vis the extended family system. Although we on ly have
limited information about the character of these relations, we assurne that
initially they must have beenmainly personaL. Kassa and some of his
secretaries knew of individuals who could be contacted whenever a specific
problem arose.
15 A certain number of Béninois in town actually held positions in the Congolese
administration. Although none of them, as far as we know, held positions of particular
interest for the fishermen, it seems likely that they have played a catalytic role in this
proeess.
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It is probably correct to say that in the 1970s, ARB - Congolese relations
gradually became stronger, not only in number, but also in character. For
the Congolese authorities, ARB began to demonstrate many useful sides.
It supported a wide range of money collections launched by Congolese
authorities,16 and it proved useful in a great many matters relating to tasks
allocated to the polIce, the municipal authorities etc. where the same
authorities realised they would have great problems in solving them alone.
When the port authorities in 1981 had to relocate many Popo (and ViIi) due
to the expansion of the petrol off-shore industry, ARB played an important
and constructive role. This lIst could be continued, but a statement from a
high-ranking Congolese civil servant in 1992 may serve as a good illustra-
tion: "ff only our Congolese brothers were organised the way the Popo are,
we would have far less problems in this country." But ARB-B also
demonstrated strength and internal authority. In connection with the
repatriation episode, the ARB- Borganised "production strikes" led to a
virtually empty fish market, making it clear to all that the presence of the
Popo had at least some advantages. Jf relations between ARB and
Congolese authorities have been characterised by a certain mutual
understanding, part of the explanation is that "everyone" knows what the
impact would be if the Popo were sent away.
It is probably safe to say that relations between ARB-B and the
Congolese administration have gradually become more institutionalIsed -
if we by institutionalisation mean that relations become less dependent on
individuals. There is lIttle doubt that many Congolese government
institutions, probably by gradually realising the utility of ARB-B, today
of ten have a fairly permanent type of relation with ARB-B, not exclusively
dependent on the individuals involved. A good indicator of this is that
relations seem to be upheld despite considerable changes in personneI as a
result of the re cent democratisation proeess in the Congolese administration.
This is not to say that relations have been formalised, neither that the
overall relationship between the Congolese government and ARB-B has
ceased to be delicate and of ten problematic. In mid-1991, the great majority
of the Pop o continued to live without residenee permits and other legally
required documents. This situation has forme d the basis of recurrent
complaints from Congolese authorities as well as the general public.
16 During 1991 and some months of 92, almost one millon FCFA were collected for
"Congolese" purposes: school benehes in Pointe Noire, support to families of railway-
accident victims, participation of the Congolese national team in the African football
championship in Dakar, and road maintenance in one of the beach vilages.
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Various events in the most recent development of ARB-B state relations
underscore the point of increased institutionalisation, as well as an
increased role of institutions from both govemments in the organisation and
functioning of ARB-B. After a Béninois consulate was established in
Pointe-Noire in 1991, contacts with the Béninois state have increased
noticeably. In connection with the establishment of the Consulate, ARB and
its branches were restructured, and new boards were for the first time
formally elected. Analysis of the election process at the beach illustrates
very clearly how Béninois consulate officials directly influenced the ARB-B
elections in support of the old establIshed leadership. Established Popo
leaders were given valuable support against an opposition of workers and
a few young owners. A new mandate and new internal regulations were
also introduced.17 The initiative for this restructuring came from govern-
ment sources. One of the consequences was that, for the first time, three
women were elected as members to each of the boards. Although much of
the restructuring must be seen as a formality, and the elected women were
handpicked by the existing leadership, the process still demonstrates how
Béninois Government officials today may and actually do intervene in
internal Popo politics.18 The Béninois Government plays its hands very
carefully in respecting the way "things work", but there is clearly an
implicit wish from the authorities for a more "modem" ARB, with greater
emphasis on pragmatic matters relevant to Pointe-Noire, instead of
traditional ideological concerns.
Illustrative here are the meetings with ARB leaders in Pointe-Noire in
November-December 1991, held by the Minister of Justice in Benin as part
of an official trip to Congo. At a time when the issue of the ZaÏrian
immgrants to Congo was very tense and a daily par of the Congolese
political agenda, the meeting mainly focused on the question of residenee
permits for the Béninois, which had also been a recurrent headache for the
Consulate. Partlyas a result of this meeting, ARB started to work
systematically in order to get the legal position of all their members
regulated. In this connection ARB-B also started participating in and
helping Congolese authorities to organise different population surveys. In
17 These documents are a sort of blueprint for mandates and regulations of any voluntary
organisation, and are thus very different from the old 1967 regulations which are much
more pragmatie and normative. However, it was explicitly stated that the new internal
regulations came as a supplement and not as a replacement for the old ones.
18 The intervention was facilitated by the fact that the president of the overall AR in town
has been appointed as consulate staff. He is himself from Grand Popo and can therefore
without problems speak and act with reference to both the ARB and the extended family
rhetoric.
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1992 this led to a noticeable increase in the number of Popo with legal
residence permits.19 In many ways, ARB-B has now started undertaking
functions earlier co ne ei ved as typical Congolese Government tasks, tasks
which ARB-B, through their particular relations with the Congolese
administration, had tried to escape.
However, if ARB has started to play a more active role in fulfilling
functions on behalf of the two govemments, this is - according to what has
been shown above - possible only if the governments themselves start
responding more to the needs of the Popo. Part of ARB's raison d'être
remains the question of collective residence and work rights. In this respect,
the "random" approach to defining the costs of residence permits, licences
and other forms of taxation is unacceptable to the Popo. In the process of
regularising the residence permits of the Popo, ARB has successfully turned
to high-ranking Congolese civil servants in order to avoid falling prey to
people from certain parts of the Congolese administration all too ready to
abuse the possibilities which this campaign represented. As a consequence,
costs in 1992 seem to have become more regulated, with the official prices
well known among the Popo. In the question of reintroducing a new
municipal tax, ARB-B was, when we left the area in November 1992,
"negotiating" the level of taxation with representatives of the municipality
of Pointe-Noire.
As mentioned, part of ARB-B'spower-base has always derived from its
relations and networks to representatives of the two states. The recent social
and economic changes in the community have probably increased the
importanee of external sources of power. Enforcing their relations to the
two govemments has made it possible for ARB-Band the system as such
to handle the socIal tensions of internal differentiation between owners and
workers which have emerged in the 1980s and reduced the escape
possibilities of the Popo workers to an extent where they are left in a
squeezed situation with very few alternatives. In the 1980s ARB-B ceased
being an institution almost exclusively corporated around a common interest
of residenee and work permts, as it may be said to have been in the 1970s.
Today it is also an important tool for the owners and to some extent their
wives, for maintaining their economic interests at the expense of the Popo
workers.
Although the Popo community may appear to be an autonomous and
strong socio-political unit, its development, in particular since the end of
19 No figures on this increase have been obtained, but according to own estimates perhaps
as much as 50 per cent of the Pop o held legal residenee permits by the end of 1992.
Among owners and their wives, the figure is considerably higher.
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the 1970s, clearly demonstrates the limitations inherent in viewing it in
isolation, independent of the other social entities with which it relates. The
community continues to be par of the greater Pop o community, and in
order to govem in Pointe-N oire, community leaders continue to depend on
a certain extent on acceptance and approval from family and religious
leaders in Benin. This explains, for example, how the leaders are able to
place restrictions on the economic activities of the most powerful women.
On the other hand, the character of ARB-B has forced Popo society into
particular forms of articulation with the rest of the Béninois and with the
Béninois and Congolese authorities which seem to influence the politics of
the states and how they deal with matters of direct relevance to the Popo,
but which also have become crucial elements for how Popo leaders handle
intern al conflicts in their own community.
Popo political leaders today employ at least two different systems of
governance, depending on which seems immediately the most opportune.
There is hardly anything surprising in this. More interesting is that the
analysis demonstrates how the old Pop o ideology still emerges as auseful
and efficient to ol for govemance, and how that in its turn reproduces and
reinforces values which at times challenge the interests of the owners and
processors. Finally it demonstrates how attempts are made to meet these
challenges. This does not mean that ARB-B remains negligent to the new
problems caused by the halt to upward mobility. On the contrary, it works
actively to find viable solutions to a conflict which many owners view with
great concern because they realise the potential threat to their own future.
Besides, current conflicts between owners and workers already affect
produetion negatively.20
Finally, one specific consequence of the Popo political organisation
should be highlighted. We have seen how much of Pop o politics in general
and their relations to government authorities in particular must be
understood on the basis of a collective need for rights of residenee and
work. "Collective" in this respect only means a limited number of people
already part of the community - not the Pop o in general. The complete
stagnation of the male population the last ten years demonstrates this point
clearly. With respect to Pop o living outside Pointe Noire, the special
alliance existing between ARB and Congolese authorities effectively
regulates the recruitment of new Popo fishermen into Congo. It is the same
20 One of the more dramatie (but probably not very viable ) suggestions forwarded by an
ARB leader was to introduce time-limited contracts of three years for all Pop o workers.
Another suggestion is to seek workers among other groups of foreigners (eg. Ghanaians).
They wil not automatically fall under the same ideology as the Popo.
58
particularities of Popo politics which ultimately explain how the Anlo Ewe
and Mina who tried to resettle in PointeNoire after 1962 have gradually
become marginalised and why they have left the community.
Through their particular relations to the governments, the Popo in Pointe
Noire have established a de facto monopoly of residence and work among
migrant fishermen, and this monopoly contributes strongly to their almost
exclusive access to certain types of resources. Other foreigners are not able
to setde; and Congolese fishermen who would lIke to compete for the same
resources fail due to the lack of similar forms of political organisation
crucial to the reproduction of the production system. All the Congolese who
have tried over the years to enter into "Popo" fishery have had to do so on
individual basis, and all have failed. The only competition for pelagic
resources comes from the small industrial purse-seiners which generally
operate in areas further off-shore compared to the Popo. But even against
those, the Popo are competitive, and several authors have noticed that in
periods where catches are big, the industrial fleet has to reduce and
sometimes even stop their fishing (e.g. NielI973). Through the processing
and distribution network established by themselves (on which the purse
seiners also depend to a certain extent), it is the Popo who dominate the
market in pelagic fish. Their only competitors for resources are granted
access as long as the market is not saturated, but when this happens it is
their competitors who have to yield.
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6. Some concluding remarks
This paper has analysed the development of the Popo migrant fisheries in
Congo as it has developed during a 30-year period. In a certain respect the
story told is banal: community development is always a result of how its
members, in cooperation and competition, intemally as well as towards
individuals and groups external to them, manage and choose to organise,
and how values, symbols and more material sources of power are
manipulated in the interests of the one or the other. The Popo community
in Pointe-Noire is certainly no different from others in this respect.
However, the main reason for presenting the analysis in this form has
been as a response to that part of the literature on West African migrant
fisheries which, through a series of oversimplifications, has interpreted its
development within the well-known framework ofuni-lineal modernisation.
Our empirical analysis demonstrates that there is nothing automatic or
"natural" in the development of the specialised migrant fisheries in West
Africa. The development processes to date has be en characterised by i.a. a
certain growth both demographically and economically. Canoes and motors
are getting bigger and better, the volurne of nets per unit and per owner has
increased and many women processors are emerging as relatively wealthy
economic actors. However, we have also seen how this development has
been fought daily, and how it has come as a result of a combination of
variables, ranging from the personal qualities of the leaders, internal matters
of legislation and organisation and the insistence on values and beliefs
which community members identify with, to particular forms of external
relations to people in Benin and in the host country. In this manner the
Popo community in Pointe-Noire emerges as both more "traditional" and
more "modern" than what many seem to think.
Further changes and developments will dep end on how these variables
are handled by the main economic, religious and political actors. Just as the
demographie growth of males came to a sudden stop in the early 1980s,
there is nothing to guarantee that economic growth will not follow the same
path. It is easy to agree on the importance of the threat of expulsion and
repatriation in this respect. However, this is only one in a range of
uncertainties connected to the further development of the Popo community.
At present, the conflicting interests between owners, workers and women
proeessors are under control, but these conflicts are also vital for
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understanding further changes. The particular type of relationship to the
home community in the Lower Mono is crucial in maintaining the present
level of governance, as are the close contacts to both the Béninois and
Congolese govemments. Nobody can tell what these relations will look like
ten years hence. The lack of opportunities among Popo workers and the
dependenee of the processors on company owners for raw material are also
central to the question of how politics are being defined. With the steadily
growing contacts into Congolese society, this picture must be expected to
change in the years to come. Already we may observe how women try to
liberate themselves financially from their husbands by increasing their
provisions of fish from the small Congolese purse seiners that land catches
in Pointe-Noire.
Whether the Popo fishery will continue to grow or whether it will
stagnate and perhaps even fall into recession will therefore depend partly
on changes in the social surroundings of their community. Primarily,
however, it will depend on how members of the community are able to
handle conflicts - the existing ones as well as those which are bound to
emerge as a result of changes in their social or natural environment. Jf one
overalllesson can be drawn from this particular study, it must be that the
main key to understanding the wide-ranging developments which have
taken place over the past 30-40 years in West African canoe fisheries must
be sought in the ability of the fishing communities themselves to fin d
viable solutions.
Despite its empirical focus, this study may also serve as an entrance to
discussions of some broader issues related to fisheries development in
general, and in West Africa more specifically. At this stage these issues can
only be indicated, pending a more in-depth treatment later. First, the
analysis serves to remind us that understanding economic development
processes requires more than merely a study of the immediate organisation
of production. In much of the literature on West African canoe fisheries,
emphasis has been put on the emergence of the companies: this is certainly
not uninteresting, but in this paper we have seen how vital a role is played
by the polItical organisation of the community. Thus it is unlikely that the
necessary availability of funds for reinvestments could have been
maintained over time, without the judicial functions in economic affairs
which ARB-B has managed to establish.
Similar arguments have long been voiced in the lIterature dealing with
West African trade. A. Cohen's (1969 and 1971) and later M. Agier's
(1983) works on the Haussa cattle trade and J.L. Amselle's work (1971) on
the Kooroko traders, all reveal the crucial importance of a particular type
of political organisation which Cohen called the trading diasporas. In many
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respects this shows formal and functionalsimilarities to the ARB-B system
in Pointe-Noire. Little work as yet has been dedicated to the study of these
aspects of social life within the West African canoe fisheries, although
references to similar institutions among many groups of migrant fishermen
abound. 1. Odotei (1989 and 1991) shows that Fante, Ga and Ewe fisher-
men in Abidjan as well as in Cotonou have established similar associations.
A. Dia (1993) has stressed the internal organisation among Wolof from
Senegal, fishing near Nouadibou in Mauritania, as Bouju (1991) in dealing
with the Sierra Leonian Temne fishermen operating in Guinea. Through
interviews with Popo fishermen who have operated in Cameroon, Gabon
and Côte d'Ivoire, we know that "ARB-Bs" exist and operate in these
countries as well. In the case of the Popo it is interesting to note how
Novincha, a Xwla voluntary association which was created in Grand Popo
in 1917 to deal with matters of common concern in the area and which still
plays an important role in the politics of the Lower Mono, is of ten used as
model for organisation abroad. In Pointe Noire however, the role of
Novincha is to a certain extent under-communicated due to the important
presence of X weda. Although the character and the strength of these
internal associations abroad will vary, there is good re as on to assurne that
the internal political organisation of the migrant West African fishermen
constitutes an important element for understanding the considerable
developments in the canoe fisheries.
One of the most important issues concerns the very interesting types of
relations which have been established between ARB and the different
governments. No doubt, these relations indicate conflicting political
strategies between the society and the states, but the analysis also reveals
an intricate and increasingly important web of collaboration, and this is a
crucial element for understanding the governanee of the community. The
way these relations have developed, and the way the functions of one
institution seem to be taken over by another, makes it highly problematic
to insist on any clear dichotomisation between ARB as "society" and the
different government offices as "the state". Just as the political system of
the Popo from the outset should be seen as an integration of the extended
families and the more recently established ARB-B, the later development
indicates that, in many ways, the Popo political system may be seen as an
integration of society and state institutions.
The analysis of ARB/government relations lInks in directly with recent
debates about the role of politics and of state/society relations with respect
to development. But whereas many current views tend to emphasise the
dysfunctions of this relationship, seeing it as an impediment to economic
growth and social development, our analysis of ARB state relations has
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indicated that the relation may be more differentiated. A major weakness
has been uncritically to classify ARB relations with individuals and offices
which formally represent the government as society-state relations. This is
too simplistic, as the persons or institutions in question may well represent
other structures and interests in addition to those of the state. However, if
we ask what have been the underlying reasons that have driven
ambassadors, consulate employees, army coloneIs, party officials, police
officers or town majors to enter into more or less reciprocal relations with
Popo leaders, it becomes difficult to ignore the factors directly connected
to their professional status, and a realisation on their part that collaboration
with ARB-B represents the most efficient means to exercise the kind of
control expected of them and connected to their positions as government
employees. This, however, does not mean that other factors like personal
gain or the interests of other parts of the society to which they belong, may
not also play a role in the total picture.
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